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ABSTRACT 
The Grass-Roots Challenges with Administration: Conscription Evasion, Contraband, and 
Resistance in Napoleonic Europe 
by 
Julia Aby Lyle 
The French model of the nineteenth century led the way to modernity in establishing centralized 
administrative governments throughout Continental Europe.  Several Napoleonic policies that 
led to the establishment of a modern centralized state were not positive in their effects on the 
local communities.  Research widely categorizes resistance to the Napoleonic program as either 
militarily or economically based.  This study uses the French court cases from the Court of 
Cassation dated 1804 to 1820 to provide a different interpretation to the discussion of local 
resistance to Napoleonic authority on an international level.  Conscription fraud, contraband, 
and resistance to government officials reveal that the local reaction in the French jurisdiction was 
based on contempt for both economic and military policies.  The research exhibits that the 
grass-roots nature of the resistance against the economic and military policies experienced under 
the Napoleonic umbrella were comparatively similar in local opposition.   
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Scholars refer to the Napoleonic era as a positive experience for Europe despite the 
spectacular failure of Napoleonic rule.  Napoleon established modernity in Europe through the 
formation of new international trade units and centralized state governments.  The militant 
empire created equality, implementing French control in the courts and administration.1  Other 
countries executed the design established by the Continental System.2  While the 
transformations developed into positive reconstructions for Europe, regions initially responded 
negatively to Napoleon's policies and visions for Europe.  Rural populations tirelessly opposed 
the central administration’s authority by resisting major policies of the Napoleonic program.  
Local inhabitants throughout the empire renounced the military and economic legislation 
employed by the French government on the regional communities.  Throughout the various 
departments in the Napoleonic government, individuals committed the crimes of desertion, fraud, 
smuggling, and violence against officials, demonstrating the extent and nature of crimes against 
French influence.  Persons committed the offenses within the local structure, but the same 
transgressions appeared frequently throughout the Continental System.   
Napoleonic policy influenced most of Europe during the early nineteenth century, as France 
grew tremendously in size due to imperial conquests.  Napoleon Bonaparte conquered and 
pressured a multitude of European states into the French empire, such as Germany, Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Spain, and Italy.  The Napoleonic government centered on imperialism.  The 
French administration forced the model of centralized government onto the annexed countries.  
                                                 
1 Alan Forrest and Peter H. Wilson, introduction in The Bee and the Eagle: Napoleonic France and the End of the Holy Roman 
Empire, 1806, War, eds. Alan Forrest and Peter H. Wilson (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 8. 
2 Horst Carl, “Religion and the Experience of War: A Comparative Approach to Belgium, the Netherlands and the Rhineland,” in 
Soldiers, Citizens, and Civilians: Experiences and Perceptions of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 1790-1820, eds. Alan 
Forrest, Karen Hagemann, and Jane Rendall (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 223. 
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By compelling the most valuable assets of the countries under the Napoleonic umbrella into the 
departmental system, France acquired access to endless resources with the territorial gains.3  
Napoleon's army required a constant supply of men, making human power a prized asset for 
French forces.  Many of the laws implemented supported the military, increasing troop 
numbers. 
To effectively execute the legislation throughout the Continental System, the central 
administration integrated the foreign acquisitions into the government, imposing the French 
model onto Europe.  Napoleon's empire was divided into "88 French" departments and "44 
foreign" departments.4  The growth of Napoleon's empire required the central administration to 
expand control throughout the empire to properly execute the military and economic programs.  
Michael Broers, in "The Napoleonic Empire," saw the absorption of the satellite countries as 
imposing obstacles on the law-and-order aspect of Napoleonic rule in the outer empire.  In the 
Dutch departments, the courts followed older precedents as opposed to the modern French 
system.5  Although incorporated into the empire in 1809, the French government saw the 
Illyrian provinces as substandard governments as late as 1813.6  The inner empire fully 
integrated into the central administration of the empire compared to the outer regions, which 
received little direction.7  Prefects, chosen men by Napoleon, controlled the functions of the 
department.  Both foreign and domestic departments experienced disorder.8  The French 
government launched special courts to vigilantly enforce the laws.  Several areas arduously 
opposed French authority, such as the Rhineland and Belgium, but the entire empire encountered 
                                                 
3 Alexander I. Grab, Napoleon and the Transformation of Europe (Houndsmill: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 19. 
4 Gavin Daly, "'Little Emperors?’ Investigating Prefectural Rule in the Departments,” in Napoleon and His Empire: Europe, 
1804-1814, eds. Philip G. Dwyer and Alan Forrest (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 44. 
5 Michael Broers, "The Napoleonic Empire," The Bee and the Eagle: Napoleonic France and the End of the Holy Roman Empire, 
1806, eds. Refe Blaufarb, Alan Forrest, and Karen Hagemann (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 74.  
6 Ibid, 77.  
7 Ibid, 78-80. 
8 Ibid, 48 
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resistance.9  The establishment of the special courts in 1801 exerted more control in areas 
energetically countering the policies.  The courts and policing authorities normally carried out 
the enactments, complying with French regulation.  The central policing force, the gendarmerie, 
applied the conscription laws and the economic blockade.  The gendarmerie consistently appear 
as executors of conscription policies while participating in the Continental Blockade.10  The 
gendarmerie extended the force of control of Paris to the local communities throughout the 
empire even though the institution preformed adequately.11 
 The centralized state relied on local governments throughout the empire as the 
administrative apparatus for applying French legislation.12  Mayors' duties shifted from the 
villager's interests to the government's needs.  The Napoleonic model changed many aspects of 
the local position, including the elections and role of the office.  During the Revolution 
residents elected mayors as chosen officials.  Under Napoleon the central government chose the 
men, turning the position into a farce.13  Napoleon took advantage of the moneyed elites of the 
local communities by placing the men in government employment.  French officials held the 
prominent occupations in the government, upholding national biases.  French persons managed 
several prefectures in the Rhineland departments rather than Germanic peoples.  French soldiers 
comprised the majority of the Italian gendarmerie.  The practice served a two-fold purpose, 
ensuring the implementation of French policy and loyalty from the officials.  The system 
struggled in every department.  The pressures from the rural communities discouraged the local 
                                                 
9 Forrest, The French Revolution, (Oxford: Blackwell Publisher, 1995), 149. 
10 This is disputed by Alan Forrest's multiple works and will be discussed later in the historiography. 
11 Daly, "'Little Emperors?’ Investigating Prefectural Rule in the Departments,” 46-48. 
12 Michael Rowe, "Between Europe and Home Town: Napoleonic Rule on the Rhine, 1799-1814," The Historical Journal 42, no. 
3 (September 1999): 645-646. [JSTOR] 
13 Forrest, "State-formation and Resistance: The Army and Local Elites in Napoleonic France," in Collaboration and Resistance 
in Napoleonic Europe: State-formation in an Age of Upheaval, c. 1800-1815, ed. Michael Rowe (Houndsmills: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2003), 645-646. 
14 Ibid, 37-38. 
15 Rowe, "Between Europe and Home Town: Napoleonic Rule on the Rhine, 1799-1814," 653-654.  Napoleonic Europe: 
State-formation in an Age of Upheaval, c. 1800-1815, ed. Michael Rowe (Houndsmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 37-38. 
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administrations’ willingness to comply, frustrating departmental prefects and the gendarmerie.14  
Historians view the innovative changes in developing integrated European governments, 
encouraged by Napoleon's economic and military policies, as reforms.  For the current analysis 
the common term "reform" improperly describes Napoleonic policy.  The term reform implies 
improvement.  Many scholars, such as Alexander Grab, in Napoleon and the Transformation of 
Europe, refer to Napoleon's policies as reforms even with exploitive laws because Napoleon's 
programs created lasting changes in Europe.15  Initially, villages responded negatively to several 
of the primary laws, establishing the lasting Napoleonic legacy.  In Napoleonic Europe the 
countries applied the French model as an example for their own administration as a requirement, 
not necessarily for improvements.  At the grass-roots level locals saw Napoleon's program as 
harmful and coercive, but the policies transformed Europe. 
The foundation for the current research originates from court cases found in the Court of 
Cassation from the years 1804 to 1820, alluding to the regional response to government intrusion 
in communal life.  The cases offer an insight into the various features of local opposition to 
French authority.  The Revolutionary government established the court in 1790, although the 
roots of the institution trace back to the Old Regime.  The suits provide a limited amount of 
information on the crimes committed.  Rather, the concern of the Court reflects the issues of 
law and ensuring the department followed the law.  As the last legal recourse of law, the cases 
deal with issues of law and procedure.  The decisions provide a sample of the crimes committed 
by individuals throughout the departments, consisting of approximately 2,656 cases.  The cases 
indicate the number of individuals being caught rather than people able to avoid detection.  The 
                                                 
16 Rowe, "Between Europe and Home Town: Napoleonic Rule on the Rhine, 1799-1814," 653-654.  Michael Broers, "The Myth 
and Reality of Italian Regionalism: A Historical Geography of Napoleonic Italy, 1801-1814," The American Historical Review 
108, no. 3 (June 2003): 703. [JSTOR] 
17 Grab, Napoleon and the Transformation of Europe, 19. 
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generic nature of the offenses allows for a more comparative study of the crimes themselves.  
The research focuses on the initial detail of the offense, only discussing the Court of Cassation 
decision if the case pertains to local opposition.16   
The suits reaffirm many of the themes on the efforts to avoid French laws in the current 
historiography.  The cases continue the debate on the military and economic programs 
implemented by Napoleon, but showing the issues on an international level.  Comparing the 
crimes from both the foreign and French departments provide examples of the policies’ effects 
throughout the significant countries in the empire.  Assuming the disputes represent only a 
fraction of the cases brought before the departmental rosters, the frequencies of appearance of 
particular crimes reflect the commonality of the offenses.  A review of these cases allows for a 
comparative study.  The departments faced similar challenges and difficulties from the local 
communities.   
Current research focuses on the central administration’s effects on a specific country or 
department, as French conquests spanned Europe establishing regional and geographical 
differences in the empire.  Language, cultural, social, and political differences existed as 
Napoleon's imperialism extended across much of Europe.  The offenses committed in the 
international cases suggest commonalities among the countries.  Several of the trends exist in 
the nature of the crimes, which appear universal in the suits.  Individuals committed the same 
forms of conscription offenses in the areas affected by the policy.  Departments in the empire 
observed self-mutilation, replacement, desertion, and fraud by men avoiding service.  Locals 
diligently engaged in smuggling operations.  The departments observed people attacking 
representations of French authority.  Despite the regional differences and the sheer size of 
                                                 
18 "The Court of Cassation," Cour de Cassation, http://www.courdecassation.fr/about_the_court_9256.html (accessed February 3, 
2013). 
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Napoleon's influence, regional resistance remained remarkably uniform in motivation and 
perpetration.  Alexander Grab completed an international comparison of many of the countries 
under the Napoleonic umbrella in Napoleon and the Transformation of Europe.  Grab's 
scholarship reveals how Napoleonic policies transformed Europe into modern centralized 
governments.  The work illustrates common themes throughout the empire such as hostility to 
conscription and economic laws, as well as French authority.  The achievement required a great 
deal of research, but Grab wrote a historiography using few primary resources.17  The Court of 
Cassation cases reaffirm many of the trends seen in Grab's analysis, but as an addition to the 
large amount of primary research already completed in many areas of Napoleonic scholarship.18  
The trials indicate variations from the arguments in established studies.  Alan Forrest states 
the gendarmerie proved ineffective in arresting deserters or individuals concealing of deserters in 
the rural areas of France.  The cases frequently display gendarmerie arresting civilians and 
conscripts for such crimes.  Around one hundred Court of Cassation cases involved a dispute 
between communities, conscripts, and the policing agency.  Conscription fraud appears as as the 
initial crime in approximately 110 cases therefore showing the gendarmerie as being slightly 
efficient.  Forrest's reliance on departmental reports might not reveal the whole story in the 
matters of conscription fraud, desertion on the local level, or the effect of French authority on the 
community.19  The cases reiterate several of the themes in the current studies of military and 
economic policies. 
The exploitive and intrusive nature of the French centralized state promoted no acts of 
nationalism from the regional communities of the departments in the Court of Cassation cases 
from 1804-1820.  The end of Napoleon's reign in 1815 led to nationalistic tendencies in several 
                                                 
19 Grab, Napoleon and the Transformation of Europe, xii. 
20 Ibid, xii. 
21 Forrest, The French Revolution and the Poor, 167, 158. 
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countries under the umbrella.  Blatant resistance and calls for civil war, in writing and speech, 
surface in 1815.  The suits from 1815 and after signify attempts to entice national sentiments 
against the monarchy and his high government officials.  The Revolutionary years marked an 
emphasis on patriotic ideology, especially during the first levée en masse in 1789.  While some 
sentiments remained, the feelings changed quickly.20  The cases of the violence enticed during 
the Napoleonic years never carried the undertones of national civil unrest.  The opposition 
reflected a general distaste for policy but always at the grass-roots level.  The lack of national 
motivation originated from the offenders and the nature of the crime.  Offenders committed the 
crimes discussed for economic or military reasons, as the programs negatively affected the 
majority of the population.   
The economic and military provocations originating from the intrusions of Napoleonic laws 
provide significant insight into the regional views of French authority.  Communities hated the 
policies.  The cases demonstrated the locals opposed the laws for both motivations.  The 
authors copiously prefer one program or the other.  Gavin Daly comes closest to a balanced 
comparison in "Investigating Prefectural Rule in the Departments," but the primary focus of the 
study is the prefect.21  The Court of Cassation cases reveal different characteristics.  The cases 
reiterate many of the trends in opposition to the policies but intriguing differences appear when 
compared to the historiography.  The defenses of hostility to authority balances between 
economic and military throughout the cases.  Conscription crimes contain the more violent 
offenses, while the economically motivated offenses appear far more often.  The crime 
determined the motivations for the offense.  The Continental Blockade correlated to the 
offenses related to smuggling, whereas deserters left compulsory military service.  Scholars 
                                                 
22 Forrest, Napoleon's Men: The Soldiers of the Revolution and Empire (London: Hambledon and London, 2002), 172-73. 
23 Daly, “’Little Emperors?’ Investigating Prefectural Rule in the Departments,” 55. 
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attest to the fact the crimes worked in tandem with each other.  Individuals involved with 
conscription fraud were in some cases involved with smuggling.  Refractory conscripts and 
deserters created a cheap labor force for local populations burdened with increasing taxes and a 
declining economic situation.  The policies in connection with the massive amount of resistance 
to the laws and agents indicate an immense local effort against Napoleonic policy falls into very 
similar patterns throughout the departments. 
The expansion of the Napoleonic Empire introduced the foundations for modernization 
and progress through intrusive programs, which fostered animosity from the regional 
communities, while establishing a new method of government.  The Civil Code, demolition of 
feudalism, and the creation of a centralized state proved reformative after 1815.  The major and 
intrusive policies implemented by Napoleon's central administration, however, negatively 
affected the everyday individuals of the empire.  The military legislation completely dominated 
the actions of the government.  Historians view conscriptions laws as the most coercive 
program of the Napoleonic period, but both policies created resentment among the regional 
communities.  The economic policies employed by Napoleon devastated Europe, destroying 
entire towns’ industries.  Necessity to enforce the laws strengthened the central administration 
throughout Europe.  The level of local opposition to these laws transcended international 
borders.  Nationalism played no role in resistance in the Court of Cassation cases.  Rather, the 
local communities faced the same military and economic concerns.  Incredibly similar, the 
methods and efforts of defiance took place from country to country.  The hostility, whether 
violent or non-violent, targeted any form of representation of the central authority of the 
Napoleonic government. 
14 
 
CHAPTER 2 
CONSCRIPTION CRIMES 
The satellite and annexed countries absorbed into the French departments adopted the 
Napoleonic form of government, featuring a centralized administration.  The government 
instituted the exploitive policies of the French conscription laws.  The most transformative 
policies imposed by the government consisted of the conscription legislation.  The laws forced 
the government to constantly evolve to cope with the local resentments.  Napoleon's success in 
assembling the massive army led to several of the European countries not under Napoleon's 
direct control adopting the design.  Prussia implemented conscription measures to compete with 
Napoleon’s forces.1  Dierk Walter asserts Prussia efficiently compelled and acquired conscripts 
compared to the challenges France encountered.  The conscription laws reconstructed much of 
Europe, creating centralized state machines executing hated legislation throughout the empire.2   
The central government’s management concentrated on enacting the military program 
throughout the departments.  The prefect ensured the local administrations met high 
conscription quotas.  Challenges faced by local administrations and departments executing the 
laws forced the policies to continually change to accommodate new needs in the empire.  The 
policies produced similar results despite geographical differences.  Throughout the empire the 
regional populations committed similar offenses to obstruct compliance, such as concealing 
deserters and assaulting the gendarmerie for arresting individuals.  Conscription evasion 
decreased with combined efforts of the gendarmerie, the special courts, the clergy, and stricter 
legislation.  The defiance desertion and local resentment posed consistently plagued the 
                                                 
1 Katherine Aaslestad and Karen Hagemann, "1806 and Its Aftermath: Revisiting the Period of the Napoleonic Wars in German 
Central European Historiography," Central European History 39, no. 4 (December 2006): 556. (JSTOR) 
2 Dierk Walter, “Meeting the French Challenge: Conscription in Prussia, 1807-1815,” in Conscription in the Napoleonic Era: A 
Revolution in Military Affairs?, eds. Donald Stoker, Frederick C. Schneid, and Harold D. Blanton, (London: Routledge, 2009), 
24-25. 
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administration, even with the changes in implementation.  The Court of Cassation cases present 
a multitude of examples verifying the local populations dislike of the military program. 
The analysis concerning conscription laws enacted by the Napoleonic government begins 
with a discussion on compulsory service during the French Revolution.  The Napoleonic 
administration reinstated conscription laws in 1798, after dissolving the old laws of the 
Revolutionary government.  In The French Revolution and the Poor, Forrest states the failures 
of social reform during the French Revolution affected few members of the rural population due 
to the high rate of poverty among the peasants.  The military changes placed on the communes 
by the Revolutionary government held greater consequences.  The transformative policies of the 
local and national governments carried a lasting impact into the Napoleonic years.  In the rural 
areas the burden fell to the lower classes, ensuring hatred and strong resistance for the 
conscription laws.3   
Scholarship on conscription policies during French occupation of the Napoleonic era has 
exploded in the last decades.  Alan Forrest excels in discussing the local connections in France 
concerning the conscription programs of both the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Era.  
Other authors and historians mention the prevalence in other states in the empire, but few 
develop the trend of the local connection to the deserters like Forrest.  Although each 
accumulation of research differs in conclusion, all of Forrest's works reiterate the same facts 
relating to conscription policy.  The difficulty associated with military service enticed distaste 
among conscripts.  The program adversely impacted the lower classes and sparked resistance 
throughout the community.  In Napoleon's Men: The Soldiers of the Revolution and Empire, the 
writings of French soldiers and the conscripts fighting in the military expressed themes found 
among the recruits of the French armies.  The study reaffirms the general discontent found in 
                                                 
3 Alan Forrest, The French Revolution and the Poor (New York: St. Martian’s Press, 1981), 144.  
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the military by discussing the poor treatment and morale of the soldiers.  Forrest establishes 
soldiers never lost the local connection with their communities, retaining a regional autonomy.4  
In The Legacy of the French Revolutionary Wars: The Nation-in-Arms in French Republican 
Memory, Forrest states the myths of nationalism applied to the French armies, spanning from the 
French Revolution to modern wars of the twentieth century.   The myth of the citizen soldier 
lost power during the Napoleonic wars.  No longer solely French, conscripts from the satellite 
countries comprised the major part of the Grande Armée.5 
By the nineteenth century, conscription changed into the most efficient tool for building a 
large army and the program influenced future military protocol.  By 1781, the wars with Europe 
generated a severe need for soldiers.  A low response to request for volunteers resulted in the 
beginning of the conscription laws.  When rural governments instituted drafting and nomination 
measures for volunteers, the opposition grew stronger.  During the French Revolution, local 
authorities exerted methods comparable to conscription and in 1793 established the levée en 
masse, a compulsory conscription law.  The local level expressed little nationalistic feelings 
normally attributed with the French Revolution.  During the Ancient Regime, regional 
communities looked down on military service, instilling deeply rooted prejudices.  Men 
exempted from service, such as those with money, high positions in society, or with promising 
job opportunities, left the lower populace to serve.  With no enforcement measures, desertion 
and refractory conscription rates soared.  During the Revolution volunteers received an initial 
payment but failed to report for duty.  The trends continued into the Napoleonic years.  The 
central administration depended upon regional authorities to administer the laws.  Hatred and 
                                                 
4 Forrest, Napoleon's Men: The Soldiers of the Revolution and Empire (London: Hambledon and London, 2002), 152, 161, 172. 
5 Forrest, The Legacy of the French Revolutionary Wars: The Nation-in-Arms in French Republican Memory (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), 57. 
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violence added to the difficulties of enforcement.6 
The development of the central administration during the Napoleonic years offers new 
dimensions to historical research, although the methods of resistance continued.  Departmental 
reports from prefects and their assistants detail the barriers associated with the execution of the 
laws.  Current research gives much credence to such evidence.  Forrest substantially depends 
on reports in Conscripts and Deserters: The Army and French Society During the Revolution and 
the Empire.  Some of the claims, determined by departmental reports and prefects complaints, 
contrast with the Court of Cassation cases.  The men writing the reports stood detached from 
the grass-roots administration executing the laws.  Forrest contends the prefect reported the 
government made little headway in policing the forest laws, but the court cases dispute the 
explanation.  Forest offenses being brought before the Court of Cassation appear approximately 
476 times.  Over seventeen percent of the Court of Cassation cases dealt with forest crimes.  
Locals grazed animals in the woods, cut trees, confronted forest rangers, and hunted without 
licenses.  The decisions progress through all departments, but the majority of the departments 
remained French.7   
In Conscripts and Deserters, Forrest reports the gendarmerie remained ineffective on the 
local level in France in applying conscription laws.8  Forrest maintains the resistance fostered in 
France under the conscription laws supported the local sentiments dominating the empire.9  The 
general consensus among the historiography supports Forrest, asserting the institution remained 
corrupt and ineffective.  The agents demonstrated active involvement in searching for refractory 
conscripts and deserters throughout the Court of Cassation disputes.  The court overturned 
                                                 
6 Forrest, Conscripts and Deserters: The Army and French Society during the Revolution and Empire (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1989), 229-232. 
7 Ibid, 120. 
8 Ibid, 133. 
9 Ibid, 237. 
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many of the conscription offenses due to an error of law, but the gendarmerie emerged 
throughout the procedures repeatedly.  Conscription offenses appear in approximately 110 cases 
in the Court of Cassation and the majority involve the gendarmerie.  The gendarmerie 
represented the central administration in enforcing laws and arresting individuals for committing 
offenses, as well as being the victims of violence from the local populations.   
When unable to meet quotas and with a lack of administrative support in the regional 
communities, France turned to militant force.10  In the Continental System the gendarmerie led 
the enforcement of conscription on the local level.  The individuals of the institution answered 
to officials in Paris rather than the rural population.  In the satellite and annexed countries the 
mostly French gendarmerie ensured loyalty to France.  The historiography disputes the 
effectiveness of the gendarmerie.11  Alan Forrest minimizes the extent of the gendarmerie in 
enforcing Paris's edicts in France during the Napoleonic years.12  Others, such as Alexander 
Grab, contend the limited number of men serving in the enforcement agency allowed for the 
group to be little more than mildly effective.13  Michael Broers states the Italian gendarmeria 
emerged as a successful managerial agency for central administration.  The rigorous controls 
executed on the military group determined the success of the institution.  The management 
allowed for the bureaucracy to exert more effective authority in Italy than held before.  The 
gendarmeria remained a viable force in Italy until the last few years of the Napoleonic Empire.14 
The gendarmerie proved as prone to corruptness as other political institutions, participating 
                                                 
10 Forrest, "State-formation and Resistance: The Army and Local Elites in Napoleonic France," in Collaboration and Resistance 
in Napoleonic Europe: State Formation in an Age of Upheaval, c. 1800-1815, ed. Michael Rowe (Houndsmills: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2003), 46. 
11 Frederick C. Schneid, Soldiers of Napoleon's Kingdom of Italy: Army, State, and Society, 1800-1815 (Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1995), 91. 
12 Forrest, The French Revolution and the Poor, 158. 
13 Alexander Grab, Napoleon and the Transformation of Europe, (Houndsmill: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 23. 
14 Michael Broers, "Centre and Periphery in Napoleonic Italy: The Nature of French Rule in the départements réunis, 
1800-1814," in Collaboration and Resistance in Napoleonic Europe: State-formation in an Age of Upheaval, c. 1800-1815, ed. 
Michael Rowe (Houndsmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 65-67. 
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in the prohibited activities plaguing the administrative government.  Poor wages led to bribery.  
In "Laroquebrou [a gendarme] allowed two prisoners . . . under escort to break free."15  Unable 
to come up with a feasible explanation, people assumed bribery played a role in the agent's 
actions.  "The conscripts [were] bound and handcuffed at the time when they escaped," leaving 
no question as to whether the officials allowed the men to escape.16  The individuals enforcing 
the laws transformed into the criminals in the rural communities rather than the draftees evading 
service.17  
Conscription grew into a massive operation in the empire, requiring bureaucratic 
centralization and cooperation.  The burden to meet quotas fell to all departments.  The 
practice of drafting men to fight in the military existed before in Europe, but the Napoleonic Era 
saw rapid military growth.18  The Loi Jourdan Delbrel in 1798 implemented annual 
conscription.  The conscription laws secured a continuous supply of men, installing various 
levels of recruitment to take place at different times.  Comparatively, the levée en masse in 1793 
recruited a large number of men at one time.  Theoretically, the Loi Jourdan Delbrel outfitted 
the conscription pool with new recruits every year.  The decree impacted young men between 
the ages of twenty and twenty-five.  The method systematically ensured men for service rather 
than establishing a massive standing army.  Napoleon's need for a legion to fight his multiple 
wars ironically meant the army remained numerous.19  In the last years Napoleon called all 
reserves into service, creating greater cause for resistance.20  The extent of Napoleonic policies 
led to increased enforcement from the centralized state. 
Napoleon's military program led to the creation of the centralized state through the 
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delegation and laws required to meet conscription quotas as well as enforcement.  The policies 
dominated rural authority, establishing motivations for violence among draftees and the local 
community.  Enforcement created violence against officials while the programs fostered 
dissention in the form of concealing, fraud, desertion, and corruption.  Imperialism remained 
the primary function of the government focused on the military.21  The army influenced all 
aspects of social and political life.22  The satellite states acted in cohesion with the French 
government to create the massive Grande Armée.  Necessity dictated the growth of the empire, 
offering new revenues and creating immense conscription levees.23  Conscription compliance 
and numbers in the departments determined the prefect's failure or success.24  Frederick Schneid 
asserted the growth of the Napoleonic Empire benefited Europe.  During the height of imperial 
power conscription demands reduced with the growth, creating less need for conscripts 
throughout the empire.25  Such an argument falls short in the discussion of grassroots resistance.  
The reaction for the policy remained as the empire prospered.  Never appearing for service, 
conscripts turned refractory.  Deserters lived in the open with local protection.  Provincial 
communities regarded conscripts with understanding, harboring, hiring, and rioting for the 
compelled men.  Elites and government officials turned to fraud instead of executing the French 
laws.  The individual and regional efforts took place internationally, as seen in the similarity of 
the crimes in all the departments.    
The execution of conscription requirements posed the greatest challenge to the local 
administration as the inductees despised the laws.  During the French Revolution the 
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government proved insufficient to handle the complications posed by conscription avoidance.  
Napoleon stabilized the situation by dealing with draft dodgers and creating stricter laws for 
replacement.26  The obstacle remained in the departments’ inability to actually prevent the 
offenses.  Desertion rates increased, never waning.  The central administration introduced new 
measures for management but conscription remained a governmental administrative nightmare.  
Insoumission, exemptions, replacements, desertion, and locals made the laws difficult to 
execute.27  By the last years of the empire, the conscription program ran smoothly as an 
administrative military machine even with the persisting high levels of desertion and resistance, 
contributing to the creation of centralized government in Europe.28     
The implementation of the conscription laws created a complex system of administration, 
allowing for frequent errors to occur and for conscripts to fall through the cracks.  The Court of 
Cassation decisions saw some draftees taking advantage of such mistakes.  In a case brought 
before the court in 1812, in the imperial court of Rome, the conscription records listed Pierre 
Cossa's son Jean, a conscript of 1803, by the name of Jean Cossa, son of Ange.  The listed name 
belonged to a deceased family member.  The son took advantage of the mistake, claiming the 
list requested the dead family member, allowing Jean Cossa to avoid service.29 
Any positive feelings for French authority during the early stages of occupation quickly 
faded.  Several satellite and annexed countries willingly accepted French rule as an anticipation 
of fundamental changes.  Southern Germany entered into an alliance with France to gain 
modernity and civilian rights.30  The situation grew worse under French occupation.  
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Conscription and poor economic policies negatively affected the empire states.31 
The central and local governments undertook great efforts to improve cooperation in the 
rural communities.  Horst Carl, in "Religion and the Experience of War: A Comparative 
Approach to Belgium, the Netherlands and the Rhineland," maintains great lengths were taken to 
positively influence the local communities throughout the empire in favor of Napoleonic 
authority and conscription.  The governments enlisted the Catholic and Protestant churches in 
the Rhineland and the Netherlands to influence rural communities.  Messages and sermons 
targeted cooperation with France.  The church portrayed the image of Napoleon as positive to 
aid in establishing France as the ruling authority and guardian.  The role of the church 
comprised a single aspect in the campaign to win the rural communities.32     
The departments envisioned new cooperation by reorganizing the local governments.  
Villagers reacted negatively to mayors seen as puppets of the central administration.  Local 
officials quickly realized following Napoleon's dictates amounted to a loss of regional authority.  
The central administration directed laws onto the community through the mayors.  The 
responsibility to meet the required number of conscripts fell to the mayor to support the 
prefects.33  When the mayor met the quotas, local opposition soared.  Intelligent, able men 
refused to serve due to the nature of the position.34  The position required mayors to stand alone 
and avoid persuasive influences, while acting in the best interests of the central government.  
Elites with no social ties to the community offered the choice candidates for local administration.  
Napoleon's ideals fell short of the concepts of republican government.  The method backfired in 
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several instances, when mayors separated themselves from the central administration.35  Mayors 
and elites seen as distant from the community held few local alliances.  The local government 
turned to the military for implementation and subduing of rural hostility.  Lentaigne de 
Logiviére, mayor of Caen, in 1812 requested military intervention when the provincial 
population actively challenged his control, destroying Logiviére's property due to a very high 
price on bread.  Logiviére asked for the power to administer extreme punishment against a few 
the offenders.  The incident led to the execution of several individuals, including a minor.36 
Due to the negative response of the rural communities, many mayors took the opposite 
position to Napoleon's administrative system.  The government handed fines and terms of 
imprisonment to officials refraining from enactment of the laws.  The populace saw these men 
as local heroes and rural areas admired the disgraced mayor.  Much like those who committed 
crimes of resistance, the community declined to label the mayors in defiance as criminals.37  
Rural sympathies and popular opinion influenced the local administration.  Self-interests ruled 
the actions of mayors and bailiffs as opposed to Napoleon's desires.  Such situations limited the 
prefect's effectiveness.   
Mayors and other officials assisted in the local's fraudulent attempts to evade conscription 
laws as opposed to following the administrative dictates.  One prefect declared the lack of 
intelligence of the local authorities caused the rural resistance.38  The officials of the communes 
turned to corruption, instead of invoking the wrath of the local populations.39  In an 1808 
decision by the Court of Cassation, Jacques Clauss, the mayor of Albig in Germany, received 
charges for breaking conscription laws.  Clauss omitted two eligible names from the list of 
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available draftees.40  In an 1808 discussion, a mayor changed Jean-Baptiste Pellorce's birth 
certificate from 1783 to 1782, allowing the conscript to qualify for a replacement in France.41  
Regional authorities dealt with the community first hand.  The mayors and clerks executed the 
central administration's program, received the backlash.  Naturally, the rural administrators 
sanctioned the populace resistance to the central administration.   
Evidence exists of the corruption reaching to the prefect's administration in the departments 
expressing sympathy for the local population.  In France, "the government fired the general 
secretary of the prefect of Gard, Blachier."42  Blachier sold false conscription replacement 
certificates for the years 1798 and 1799.43  The "affaire du Cantal" involved over a hundred 
people from the prefect's department in conscription frauds.44  An investigation to determine the 
extent of the conscription fraud took place in Rouen.  The local elites laboriously safeguarded 
their children from service through fraudulent certificates and exemptions.  Gavin Daily 
maintains though the prefect was never officially charged with the corruption crimes, the 
instance "[suggests] at least indifference on the part of the prefectural administration to such 
abuses."45   
Unlike local authoritarian resistance, departmental resistance rarely occurred within the 
cases, although a few examples appeared.  Conscription led to less antipathy in the departments, 
allowing for compliance between the governments concerning military policy.  Variations from 
the rule occurred.  The departments in the Rhineland appeared in the cases as being difficult to 
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control in terms of conscription laws.  According to some departmental governments, 
conscription laws applied to draftees, but not to the local populations.  In an 1812 decision, a 
German baker in Fever, Jean Renken, harbored and housed Jean-Henrich Wichelot-Dantmeyer, a 
German refractory conscript, for three years.  The departmental courts claimed the German 
departments remained outside of the influence of the French conscription laws.  After a formal 
proclamation, Renken continued to openly and knowingly harbor the deserter.46  The case 
illustrates a blatant attempt for the German states to create some sort of autonomy from the rule 
of France.  The individuals saw France as their oppressor, a correct assertion considering the 
majority of the army consisted of conscripts.47   
The extent of officials’ defiance against following the French line continued beyond the local 
and departmental administrative officials to the agents directly enforcing the laws.  A garde 
forestier in Belgium favored the evasion of a conscript in a case brought before the Court of 
Cassation in1813.48  Franҫois Clays of the commune of Ursel received a conscription notice.  
Clays failed to respond to the appeal, turning into a refractory deserter.  Jacques Standaert, 
garde forestier of the commune of Woerschoot, employed Clays for work.  Jacques-Franҫois 
Gysels, garde champètre of Woerschoot, learned Clays worked for Standaert.49  Although, 
Standaert sought to gain Clays's release, he still allowed Clays to seek refuge in the woods when 
Gysels came after Clays.  Although acquitted, initially Standaert received a year in prison and a 
500 francs fine.50  Clays's case was one of very few Court of Cassation cases indicating a great 
deal of conscripts running into the woods to escape service.  Either the plan proved highly 
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strategic in that deserters averted getting caught by the military police forces, or the trend was 
not as prevalent as Alan Forrest expresses in Conscripts and Deserters as many of the cases 
revolved around forest crimes.51  Another case proved similar to that of Clays.  In a Court of 
Cassation decision from Belgium, Pierre-Joseph Degallez, Cécile Lorget, Louis-Joseph, and 
Jean-Baptiste Beudin arranged a complicated replacement scheme.  "Pierre-Joseph Delgallez 
served as the replacement for an 1803 conscript, Louis Beudin, from the commune of Wiers."52  
Louis Beudin’s age exceeded the law for a legal replacement, and his brother failed to report the 
replacement.  The replacement borrowed the name of Franҫois-Joseph Saligot, verified by a 
birth certificate.  Deputy Cecil Lorget and the mayor of Wiers claimed the individual carried the 
correct documentation.  Delgallez took the place of Louis-Joseph Beudin but reported under the 
incorrect name.  He admitted to committing the desertion fraud.53 
The central administration faced two major challenges from the local population and draftees 
in executing the conscription laws.  Draft dodging and desertion were rampant.  In Italy, 
"between 1807 and 1810, a total of 22,227 dodgers left their communities."54  The use of the 
Italian gendarmeria reduced the numbers of insomuissions.55  In France the rates of 
insoumission grew more severe throughout the Napoleonic years.  In 1813 Italy, "insoumission 
[rates ran] at 77 per cent."56  Germans simply refused to respond or acknowledge conscription 
requests.  At the onset of the 1798 levee en masse, thousands of men at a time left their units.  
In 1798, "in the Landes . . . out of 1,200 men, only 60 were left in uniform after a single day of 
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service."57  Desertion and draft dodging rates followed similar patterns throughout the 
departments, including the foreign departments.  After 1813, conscription draftees commonly 
resorted to desertion as a means of contempt.  Foreign conscripts fought away from home for 
French interests.58 
Desertion plagued the army and with local support, evasion by conscripts generated a good 
deal of expense for the government.  If soldiers reported for duty, the state invested money for 
clothing, weaponry, food, and other essentials.  The state sustained a loss if a soldier deserted.59  
Disdain for French authorities combined with military life, provoked desertion in the empire.60  
Administrators and officials saw offenses against conscription as crimes,while the regional 
populations failed to see the act as criminal.  Draft dodging and desertion instilled a communal 
sense of resistance by the participation of the community, leaving the administration to deal with 
the problem.61 
Draftees evaded service for several reasons even though the government’s annual 
conscription needs changed regularly.62  Alan Forrest asserts "the demands of the recruiting 
officer were particularly heavy in 1807 and 1808, lighter in 1809 and 1810 when peace seemed 
to be in prospect, then utterly savage from 1811."63  Fighting in the army promoted little 
enthusiasm from the conscripts.  The trends from the Revolutionary period repeated during the 
Napoleonic Era.  Compulsory service, military strictness, resentment, poor living conditions, 
and low morale motivated conscription avoidance.  The pool concentrated on young men 
unfamiliar with conscription policies.  The drafting process and social distinctions nurtured the 
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growing resentment.  Volunteers chose to face the difficulties of military service.  Conscription 
removed the freedom of choice.  The method of selection split the younger male population 
between the fortunate and the unlucky.  Money created opportunities to avoid service.  
Deplorable military conditions contributed to the evasions, especially during the later years.  On 
the field, poor conditions combined with a minimal chance of survival.  A brilliant military 
mind, Napoleon threw men at his opponents, with little thought to the cost of life.  In 1813, 
Johann Friedrich Burg illustrated the conditions of conscription in Germany as "Thousands 
slaughtered on the battlefield, thousands becoming cripples, yet more people [fell] into poverty, 
misery and distress - thousands dying before their time - the atrocities of war [were] 
indescribable."64  
The extensive complication of draft dodging and desertion centered around civilian 
involvement.65  For rural populations, the ideals behind the principle of conscription, the 
ideology of a national duty, held no resonance.  The rural populace suffered the largest burden 
and conscription injured the traditional ways of life.  Limitations and compulsion hindered the 
locals' work.  The attempts to centralize the rural population alienated the populations against 
the government and military.66  Alexander Grab contends "rural Italy viewed conscription as a 
major disruption and threat to its everyday life and . . . determined to defy [the policy]."67   
The conscription laws aroused controversy throughout the rural population.  Isser Woloch's 
"In the Aftermath of the French Revolution" contends the Napoleonic administration ensured 
compliance by adopting the laws, though most of the population resisted the ordinances.68  
Conscription laws exploited the local population, leading centralized government to combat the 
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communities' efforts to avoid service.  Italians attempted to retain autonomy, according to 
Alexander Grab in "Army, State, and Society: Conscription and Desertion in Napoleonic Italy 
(1802-1814)" by reacting to conscription with hostility.  Grab describes conscription as "the 
principle battleground between individuals and local communities on the one hand [with] the 
central state on the other."69  Italy's experience with conscription laws in terms of the separation 
of the community from the government reflected the experiences of other countries consumed 
into the Napoleonic era.  The central administration focused on implementing the programs of 
the French government.70  Ute Planert, in a study on conscription in Germany, maintains “no 
other issue imposed so much trouble on the people of Napoleonic Europe as conscription.”71  
The local populations rallied behind deserters and draft dodgers.  The communal opposition 
began in France during the French Revolution.72  The trend of local loyalty to deserters 
continued throughout the satellite countries.73  The reaction formed in regional acts of 
resistance, centered in the villages and communes.  The conscription laws grieved the local 
individuals.  Compliance provided no immediate compensation for the rural peoples.  Many of 
the Court of Cassation conscription cases from 1804 to 1820 resulted from knowingly harboring 
deserters and refractory conscripts.  In several cases the offenders worked for the civilians as 
farm hands and apprentices.  Frédérich Rulff employed Chretien Rulff, a refractory conscript 
since 1811.  Frédérich Rulff hired the conscript as a domestic laborer.74  According to Forrest, 
in France, concealers of conscripts experienced harsher sentences compared to deserters.  The 
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government sentenced Frédérich Rulff to a 500 francs fine and a year in prison.75  These 
appellate cases occur frequently and Forrest claims in many instances, "mitigating 
circumstances" led to the immediate mistrial of the offenses.76  Widows, parents, mayors, and 
sympathetic perpetrators acquired free passes in some cases.77  The suits indicate individual 
civilians initially received a harsh sentence for the crime.  Many of the appellate actions in the 
Court of Cassation overturned the concealment suits due to legal issues concerning the original 
trial or the nature of the accusation.  The government charged several of the offenders in 
military courts, the incorrect venue for civilians.  Sympathy factored into the Court of Cassation 
cases, with a few suits of bailiffs or leading officials attempting to retry the case due to an 
acquittal.   
Cases of rural aid for drafted men thwarting the military policies appeared often in the Court 
of Cassation from 1804 to 1820.  In southern France, in 1799, a baker of Villefranche, Jean 
Oustry, concealed Guillame Ferrand, conscript deserter in his home.  The government 
condemned Oustry to a 1500 francs fine and community service.78  Franҫois Rousseau, a 
French tile manufacturer, concealed Vincent Bourcier, a deserter of the dragoons, as a worker in 
his factory in 1799.79  In France, Antoine Darrier and Jacques Viellefon helped a conscript 
desert in an 1806 decision.  The department charged the men a 300 francs fine and up to a year 
of prison.80  In France, Desneux, a miller and farmer, concealed the fugitive deserter Garnier in 
a case brought before the Court of Cassation in 1806.  Desneux employed Garnier, claiming he 
unknowingly hired a conscript.  The government convicted Desneux for not reporting the 
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deserter to the government.81  
The opposition to conscription turned into family affairs in several of the Court of Cassation 
cases.  The resistance and offenses involved not only the conscripts and the local communities, 
but family members.  Some parents went beyond hiring a replacement or forging documentation.  
In 1812, in southern France Marie Cross helped her son, a refractory conscript, escape from the 
prisons of Limoux.82 
Several trials proved the local communities’ feelings on conscription exceeded the 
limitations imposed by nationality.  In an 1812 discussion, the German, Henri Liessem received 
a 300 francs fine and year in prison for helping with "the desertion of two French soldiers."83  
Another case brought before the Court in 1812 detailed a court in Amsterdam that convicted 
Willem Schmidt for concealing a refractory conscript.   Schmidt concealed and employed Jean 
Frederic Stroch, a refractory conscript from Germany.84  The rural efforts to resist French 
authority crossed national borders.  Much of the historiography focuses on one particular region 
according to the historian.  The conscription evasion extended beyond departmental barriers.  
The locals, despite geographical differences, harbored or aided foreign conscripts, adding another 
dimension to the level of resentment for government authority.  Such cases indicate the distaste 
for the military program extended beyond a particular region or department within the empire.        
Conscripts used fraud, a tradition well-established during the French Revolution, as a means 
to escape conscription service.  Conscripts and their families committed the fraudulent actions 
of falsifying passports, death and birth certificates, and conscript replacements.  Laws inhibited 
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a conscript's movement throughout the empire, including the requirement for registrations and 
passports.  Frequently, the use of counterfeit travel papers resulted as an attempt to avoid 
service.85  The fraudulent activities began during the 'voluntary' attempts to acquire soldiers in 
the late 1700s by high officials and wealthy villagers.  Forrest attributes the fraud to many of 
the hard feelings experienced by the rural peasants.86  The fraud cases indicated similar trends 
of forgery to evade conscription.  The administrators appeared to the persons with the access to 
produce counterfeit documents with ease.   
The upper classes commonly committed the offenses relating to conscription fraud involving 
large sums of money.  If given permission from the prefect, conscripts hired others to take their 
place.  The government applied strenuous rules for legally substituting a conscript draftee.  In 
Italy Carlo Ambrogio Pollo hired a substitute for 1808.  After the injury of the substitute, the 
government required Pollo to hire another replacement or come to the front lines himself.87  
Although legal recourses existed, conscripts resorted to similar methods of fraud.  Individuals 
illegally hired others to take their places such as the case of the Vangoethems.  In Belgium, 
1813, Vangoethem, father and son, violated conscription laws.  The Vangoethem father hid his 
son, the conscript, through a fraudulent replacement.  Vangoethem hired Gilles-Franҫois Rottier, 
a draftee for year 1814, to take his son's name, drafted as a conscript of 1813.  The army 
accepted Rottier under the false name and replacing Vangoethem.  The offenses resulted in the 
commission of two crimes, both fraud and scam.88  In 1805, in Belgium, Desweemer and the 
widow Fierens "admitted to using a false name in replacing a conscript, who failed to join the 
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corps."89  The admitted replacement of the conscript, using the name Vesbreygea, provided 
papers in the name of F.J. Daer, who never joined the corps.90 
Although not as common as civilians harboring conscripts, forgeries provided a measure of 
avoidance.  Forged mayors' signatures validated a changed death certificate or passport.  Louis 
Bourguingnon altered a passport from the commune of Crépol to move freely throughout the 
territory.91  Forgery thrived as a business in many departments.92  Passports and legal 
certificates appeared prevalently in the Court of Cassation cases.  Both the upper and lower 
classes engaged in forging documents.  Individuals bought the documents for large amounts of 
money.  "In France, Pouydebat fabricated a false exemption of military service for Dubrana, a 
conscript, for the monetary sum of six hundred francs," in a decision rendered in1806.93  The 
Court of Cassation heard a case in 1806 dealing with "Pierre-Desmazes deliver[y of] a passport 
with the false name of Pierre Bertherre" in France.94  He fraudulently stated his military status 
on the passport, along with the incorrect signature.  Desmazes sought to evade military 
service.95  In an 1804 discussion, in an eastern department in France, "Philibert Barnaud, a 
soldier of the 18th regiment of the line, received a visit from his family in Melun," in northern 
France.  Barnaud presented a fraudulent signed permission slip, verified by a writing expert in 
the police administration.96 
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Several cases indicated forgeries developed into multiple person offenses.  The crimes 
involved clerks, mayors, doctors, administrators, and civilians.  In France a passport fraud hid a 
conscript in an 1806 decision.  The court failed to view the offense as a crime.  Boulois 
received a passport label with the name of Faichot.  Gloriant altered the passport for Boulois, 
the conscript.  Officials found Boulois carrying the fake passport and charged him with using 
the document.97  In southern France Jean Belain falsified the signature of the mayor of 
Minimbaste on a certificate to avoid military service, in trial brought before the Court of 
Cassation in 1807.98    
Marriage, self-mutilation, or poor attempts at forgery emerged as the most prominent 
methods of fraud for the lower classes.  Similar to the white collar aspects of high payments for 
replacements, the offenses began during the French Revolution.  Early on, draftees used 
marriage to prevent conscription in France.  Older women or the less desirable women married 
very young men for compensation.99  Self-mutilation prohibited a conscript’s recruitment.  The 
loss of a finger or another body part inhibited a soldier's ability to perform.100  Although 
barbaric, the method continued during Napoleonic conscription.  Disabilities such as blindness, 
deafness, and epilepsy allowed for exemption.  Conscripts dodged service by fraudulently 
declaring the debilitating defects.  In many cases the conscript required a single "eye witness 
testimony," making fraudulent disabilities difficult to establish.101  Examples of such medical 
frauds appeared in the Court of Cassation cases.  In 1813, the Frenchmen "Jean Magenot 
voluntarily disabled a conscript drafted 1814," by cutting off part of Jean-Baptiste Julien's thumb 
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to avert a public order.102  Julien gave Magenot his consent.103  Self-mutilation expressed the 
extent of the desperation conscripts faced, even at the risk of death.  In the department of 
Seine-Inférieure the prefect noted an individual pulled all of his teeth, while others used acids 
and incense, making themselves sick.104 
Rural communities throughout the empire took great lengths to avoid the Napoleonic 
program for compulsory military service.  Even with the establishment of the gendarmerie and 
stricter laws, the local communities rallied against the program.  Deserters and draft dodgers 
received protection from the rural populace in addition to the individual efforts taken to avoid 
conscription.  The central administration turned into the enemy and the communities never saw 
personal attempts to avoid conscription as negative.  The amount of local resistance 
demonstrated the extent of hatred the locals felt for the program throughout the departments.  
The resistance shown in the Court of Cassation cases transcended the departments indicating the 
efforts of the locals were similar and involved all members of the community.  Offenses against 
the military program showed the locals resentment for government in the regional communities.
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CHAPTER 3 
ECOMONIC CRIMES 
Continental Europe experienced crippling economic policies during Napoleon's reign.  The 
government re-established old excise taxes on certain goods, such as sugar and salt.  The prices 
on foodstuff increased markedly in Revolutionary and Napoleonic Europe.  The Continental 
Blockade and the British Blockade exacerbated the situation.  French favoritism in economic 
matters established the most damaging aspects of Napoleon's policies.  High taxes, food prices, 
unemployment rates, and growing local resentments afflicted a large portion of the empire.  
Much like the conscription offenses, the financial aspects to Napoleon's transformative central 
administration caused similar crimes and efforts of resistance from the local populations.  
Smuggling contraband, both exports and imports, appeared frequently in the Court of Cassation 
cases as a copious offense stemming from the combination of economic tensions.  The policies, 
notably the Continental Blockade, intertwined with French military goals, establishing a form of 
economic warfare.1   
During war blockades performed an important role in hindering an opponent’s trading 
capabilities.  The Continental Blockade turned counteractive, causing more harm to the 
Napoleonic Europe than Napoleon's enemies.  The monetary difficulties in the empire started 
before Napoleon's Continental Blockade.  The commercial strains in France began in 1803 with 
the British Blockade of French goods.2  Napoleon announced the Berlin Decree of 1806 and the 
Milan Decree of 1807, essentially cutting off the majority of Continental Europe from trade with 
England legally.  England dominated European trade.  Prohibiting all British goods, the 
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Blockade allowed for a break in competition in Europe.  The supremacy of legal trade switched 
in Europe from England to France.  All countries under the Napoleonic umbrella bought 
merchandise and materials from France.  Initially, Napoleon's reaction appeared sound, but the 
original intent for the blockade resulted in little damage to England due to the mastery of 
smuggling in the empire.3  Being unable to sell British goods in Europe, an overflow of 
merchandise produced economic despair in England.  Napoleon envisioned a French monopoly 
on the European textile market, further weakening a dependent England.4  But British goods 
were not as expensive as French materials and the countries in the empire resorted to crime to 
avoid the added costs.5  
The economic system, although meant to entrench France as the major competitor in Europe, 
failed miserably.  As a strong contender in other trade markets, England was not dependent 
solely on European commerce.   England's long established roots in colonial trade limited the 
blockade’s effectiveness on British trade to importations.  The Court of Cassation cases 
evidenced the French empire’s major economic challenges stemmed from the local populations 
attempting to obtain foreign goods.6  Approximately seventeen percent of the cases questioned 
the legality of goods brought into the empire.  The economic warfare constrained England 
minimally.   British goods, particularly cottons and textile materials, retained first choice within 
most of the empire.  The expensive French materials led the communes within the empire to 
resort to crime, paying for cheaper British goods.  Limited access to foreign markets created a 
reliance on Europe for trade.  When Santo Domingo gained autonomy in 1804, France lost the 
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greatest asset of French colonial trade.7       
French law considered all open trade with England in the Continental System illegal until 
1814.8  The British smugglers established a black market port for continued trade within the 
French empire.  The Continental Blockade was so unproductive, Robert A. Doughty and Harold 
E. Raugh, Jr., in "Embargoes in Historical Perspective," state cotton importation increased from 
"58.4 million pounds per year" to "83.1 million pounds per year" from 1806 to 1807.9  
Trafficking grew into an impressive operation "includ[ing] commissions and insurance rates" to 
help protect the safety of the merchandise.10  Known as the "Warehouse of Europe," England 
established warehouses in Helgoland to maintain trade with cities under French authority, such as 
Hamburg.11  America participated in the illegal trade, carrying British goods to the Dutch 
countries.  French customs officials declared neutral ships carrying goods without licenses as 
enemies, seizing the merchandise and making trade more difficult.12   
The most important aspect of Napoleon's economic blockade was the Continental Blockade.  
Very few areas in the empire failed to feel the negative effects of the burden, leading to another 
reason for communal resentment for government authority.  Unlike conscription laws, 
individuals could not readily walk away from their financial difficulties.  Historians theorize on 
the enactment of the Continental Blockade.  Edgar Kiser and Joshua Kane contend Napoleon's 
economic policies reflected the Old Regime's abrasive laws.13  Katherine Aaslestad, in 
“Revisiting the Continental System: Exploitation to Self-Destruction in the Napoleonic Empire," 
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promoted economic development in the Continental System by targeting England's economy.14  
In Europe, the most common form of revenue remained agrarianism, and the Blockade led to 
some industrial development.   Industry in France, Belgium, and the Rhineland, according to 
Aaslestad, “developed rapidly between 1807 and 1810” as a result of the Continental Blockade.15  
Several examples stemmed from cities receiving an economic boost under the new system.  The 
Rhineland's economy grew in the wake of the blockade.  The textile businesses in Württemberg, 
a city in the German states, profited from the program.  With a lax port regulation, the 
Rhineland installed more contacts and markets.  International trade thrived as the country 
established trade markets with other ‘inner Empire’ countries.16  
The extensive damage caused by the Continental Blockade to the Continental System limited 
any growth in the empire to specific instances.  The Blockade adversely affected the majority of 
the empire.  Existing means of economic viability fell in the wake of the creation of new trade 
routes, taking precedence over the pre-established systems.  The Blockade ruined shipping 
industries in several satellite and annexed countries, leaving ports empty and men jobless.  
Almost all trade between Cologne and Holland stopped.17  In Italy the poor economic situation, 
strict taxation, and conscription fostered resistance among local populations.18  The 
combination of factors generating from the French policies increased the strains on the lower 
classes.19     
The Blockade's crippling effects led to the destruction of industries in European cities.  The 
Hanseatic city of Hamburg, according to Aaslestad, offers an example of the destructive nature of 
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the Continental Blockade.  The obstacles in the city of Hamburg essentially began during the 
British blockade in 1803.  Although Hamburg attempted to stay neutral to remain economically 
strong, the city lost a good deal of the established trade network.  Hamburg suffered from the 
economic policies of French administration after being annexed into France in 1810.  The 
economy revolved around international trade during the eighteenth century.  Hamburg, before 
the effect of Napoleon's policies, "functioned as a financial, diplomatic, and communication hub 
as well."20  The citizens of Hamburg resorted to trafficking, using land routes rather than 
seaports.  When incorporated into the Napoleonic Empire, the protectionist policies of France 
escalated the situation.  Similar to conscription enforcement, the customs officials, droit réunis, 
and gendarmerie found the policies difficult to fulfill.  Corruption among government officials 
allowed for trade with England to go virtually unhindered until 1810.  French protectionist 
measures intensified.  Elites made profits; the local population relied more heavily on 
smuggling.  Despite any positive policies incorporated by the government, the economic and 
military programs negatively affected the city.21  From 1811 to 1813, increased economic 
tensions and government intrusions became the bane of the local populations.  The interference 
provoked public resentment toward French authority figures.22 
Other policies linked with the Continental Blockade intensified the situation.  The 
Napoleonic years led to the inflation of the price of goods in addition to high taxes.  Economist 
Kevin H. O'Rourke published a remarkable article in 2005 examining the various differences in 
price hikes in Europe during the Napoleonic years and after.  In "The Worldwide Economic 
Impact of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars," O'Rourke established France received the 
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most damage from the wars and the blockade.23  He compared the inflation prices from the 
Revolution and Napoleonic period to the prices after 1816 in Europe, as well as other continents, 
such as Africa and Asia.  Prices for basic goods imported into the Continental System escalated.  
Historians such as Katherine Aaslestad establish the severe problems associated with the 
economic situation in the textile industry in Germany during Napoleon's reign.  Aaslestad's 
most extreme statistics failed to compare with O'Rourke's economic analysis.  O'Rourke stated 
the textile "prices [in France] during 1789-1815 were 77% higher than during 1816-30."24  War 
affected the prices of certain materials, such as iron, but the Blockade affected foodstuff items, 
like sugar and coffee.  The countries under the Napoleonic umbrella experienced even higher 
inflation rates.  O'Rourke claims in the Netherlands, "sugar was an astonishing 577% dearer 
during 1807-12 than it had been before the war and 277% dearer than its post-war average."25  
The empire experienced similar patterns.  In Germany "the price of sugar was 190% higher 
during 1807-12 than after the war; the relative price of raw cotton was 169% higher; the relative 
price of coffee was 197% higher; and the relative price of tobacco was 121% higher."26  With 
remarkably high costs for imported and French goods, many individuals resorted to smuggling.     
The high price of goods correlated with the French excise taxes, re-established by the 
Napoleonic government, on products such as salt and wine.  Jean Josseau fraudulently imported 
salt into France in a decision rendered by the Court of Cassation in 1808.  He failed to pay the 
salt taxes.27  In 1813, in the court of Casal, a ranger accused Widow Catherine Montano, a 
cabaret owner and wholesale seller of wine, of embezzling merchandise and committing fraud 
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against her creditors.28  In Switzerland, Charles Sapit embezzled wine in 1808.  An 
examination of Sapit's cellars by an official of the droit réunis reported lower levels than legally 
reported on his documentation.  Instead of 417 hectoliters and 60 liters, he had 415 hectoliters 
and 80.14 liters of wine.29   
The Court of Cassation decisions reiterate many of the previous conclusions of Napoleon's 
economic policies and regional communities.  The blockade and high taxes proved devastating 
to communities and the number of individual offenses supports the all consuming nature of the 
effects of the blockade.  A large portion of the cases questioning the level and amount of 
smuggling in the empire, around sixty-eight percent of cases, dealt with ensuring if wine was 
smuggled by individuals.  The intrusive and exploitive nature of the economic program created 
a large amount of dissention among the local communities.30  
The suits expand the discussion further by viewing the offenses committed in terms of the 
departments instead of location.  Similar to the conscription cases, matters of procedure resulted 
in amended and overturned cases.  In Belgium, in an 1810 discussion, officials confiscated 
fraudulent coffee and sugar.  The records indicated the wrong place of origin, leading to the 
Court of Cassation voiding the charges against Sieurs Moevenhaut, Vanstacq, and Aertsens.  
The procedural error annulled the decision although multiple people introduced the items into 
France.31  The departments veered away from compliance in economic matters to rule against 
French authority, while reinforcing the local populations’ sentiments for the laws. 
Napoleon’s economic policies generated another front to an already multiple front war.  
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The disproportionate system led many of the countries to crime for a source of revenue.  Rural 
communities verbally and physically assaulted officials under French authority.  Several of the 
regional government officials participated in smuggling, as in Hamburg, refusing to comply with 
the blockade.32  Due to the expansive amount of territory and limited resources, the prefects 
could not properly enforce the economic blockade.  The nature of the crime of smuggling 
allowed for the ease with which contraband flowed through.33  Most of the administration’s 
efforts focused on fulfilling conscription laws, taking away much of the government’s 
capabilities to protect the blockade.34  With a lack of enforcement and the role as the main 
policing force, soldiers in southern Italy made tidy profits through contraband.  The amount of 
trade in British goods traveling through the cities of "Malta and Sicily . . . grew in almost direct 
proportion to the decline in Britain's legitimate trade through ports like Livorno."35  Local 
citizens responded positively to the offenders.  Silvia Marzagailli maintained smugglers 
received the same protections afforded to conscription defaulters by the local communities.36   
Economic offenses required the government to enact changes in the enforcement efforts.  
Napoleon incorporated a licensing system benefiting selected merchants.  Without the proper 
markings, custom officials confiscated the items.  Merchants actively participated in 
profiteering, smuggling, and creating false certificates.37  Goods labeled from foreign makers 
provided easier methods of movement.  Only a select group of French merchants benefited 
handsomely from official certification.  The most basic of items required documentation.  In 
Belgium officials seized around "seventeen sacs of clover seeds.," lacking the proper 
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identification in a 1807 decision.38  Although confiscated for a lack of identification, the seeds 
were probably nothing more than animal fodder.  The use of false certificates for importation 
led to increased numbers of merchants employing the documents.  The certificates either passed 
off British merchandise as products from other countries or altering the certificate permitting 
legal entrance of British goods.  Approximately "590,000 tons [of British merchandise was] 
sold openly without seizures"39  In an 1811 decision, officials confiscated sixty-two pieces of 
tissue muslins with false certification for transportation of foreign merchandise in Italy.40 
In 1809, Napoleon established a smuggling port in the city of Gravelines, legalizing a 
limited form of trafficking goods in an attempt to gain profit from the illegal efforts.  Napoleon 
approved of British smugglers bringing gold for trade to the city.   Designed to protect French 
interests, British traffickers brought gold guineas and bought French goods.  Napoleon mainly 
wanted gold but traded other French products.  Seventy-seven merchants received special 
licenses to trade with the British smugglers.  Although legal trade between France and England 
transpired in the port, French law continued to demand licenses.  British cottons remained 
illegal.  The establishment of the French smuggling city reaffirmed Napoleon's French 
protectionist policies as the central administration made the choices.  French merchants 
received the exemptions.  The unfairness of the French policies reinforced the distrust in central 
authority already established through harsh conscription policies.41   
The unbalanced French economic system and protectionist policies launched a cycle of 
suffering in Europe.  Several countries relied on trade as a viable source of strength and 
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longevity in a world dominated by Britain and France.  The Continental Blockade ended many 
traditional trade relationships in Europe.42  Industry shifted from the ports due to Napoleon's 
favoritism policies.43  The Blockade caused much of the industry in Holland to bottom out.  
The majority of the population felt the economic strains, though several created new sources of 
revenue by turning to agriculture.44  All departments felt the negative effects of the protectionist 
policies.  The system helped only a few chosen individuals, fueling a backlash in the empire 
toward the French program.  The cases show similarities in the smuggling operation in France 
to other countries, such as Belgium and Italy.45   
The loss of pre-established trade and the high prices of goods created by French policies 
generated a need for different sources of revenue.  The Continental Blockade ignited resistance 
among the empire because the restrictions stopped many traditional trade relations.  Legitimate 
trade “traffic entering the Netherlands fell from 2700 vessels in 1805 to 259 in 1809 and between 
1806 and 1810 ships arriving in Hamburg declined from 3943 to 240."46  Unemployment rates 
increased rapidly in Hamburg.  Business depended on the trade industry and the Continental 
Blockade destroyed the economy.  High taxes augmented the conditions.47  The situation was 
repeated throughout the empire.  Similar to conscription, the economic policies affected the 
poorer individuals in the communities the most.48 
Commonly, locals contrarily affected by the Continental Blockade established a system of 
illegal trade.  Key countries in the attempted enforcement of the economic policies, such as Italy, 
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the Rhineland, and the Netherlands, actively smuggled merchandise.  Not limited to Napoleon's 
empire, smuggling plagued all countries involved in the conflict.   English smugglers installed 
a profitable system along the coast of England.  The smugglers grew efficient in their efforts by 
either quietly sneaking contraband across customs lines or using fraud as a means to trade.  
Trafficking contraband progressed into a productive business venture.  The French cost and 
excise taxes stimulated a high demand for cheaper foodstuffs and cotton.  Napoleon's 
administration re-established excise taxes abolished during the Revolution, including "alcoholic 
beverages, salt, tobacco, playing cards, and public transportation."49   
Smuggling transcended social distinction and government barriers in ways rarely compared 
to individuals avoiding conscription.  A few occurrences exist where communities united in 
resisting conscription laws and officials attempted to ease the burdens of the rural population.  
Conscription advanced alienation between the classes.  Regional elites and the lower classes 
heavily immersed themselves in the business of trading illegal goods.  Gavin Daly, in "'Little 
Emperors?' Investigating Prefectural Rule in the Departments," suggests whole communities 
worked together to smuggle goods.50  Many deserters participated in the illegal activities.  
Alan Forrest asserts the acceptance of smuggling by the greater local communities allowed for 
business with the enemy.  Similar to local acceptance of draft dodging and aiding deserters, 
communes failed to see smuggling as a crime.  In several cases the departments overturned the 
original decisions stating the offenders committed an offense.  French and foreign departments 
posed the same challenges to the central administration’s execution of policy.  Several people 
on the local level benefited from smuggling practices, allowing for few social distinctions.  The 
sampled years demonstrate the productive nature of smuggling in Continental Europe from 
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individuals who were caught, but no real data expresses the amount of uncensored trafficking 
during the Napoleonic years.51 
The Court of Cassation suits indicate the large-scale involvement of the local community in 
buying and trafficking illegal goods.  Napoleon realized quickly smuggling suppressed an 
effective blockade.52  Although no exact data exist on how many people avoided detection 
when smuggling, numerous cases in the sampled years illustrate how common smuggling was in 
Continental Europe, especially in British goods.53  British goods offered the practical choice for 
many people.  British cotton and textile prices were around a third of the French cost.54  
Although newer, French industry proved unable to compete with England's ability to produce 
cheaper products. 
Provincial villagers smuggled several types of contraband in and out of Europe.  Wine and 
liquor proved the most common commodity government agents investigated to see if the goods 
were smuggled.  Unlike other cases, the majority of cases questioning the legality of a person’s 
amount of wine, normally in the guise of ensuring the flow and taxation of the liquids, took place 
within the home or business of the individual.  Foodstuff, tobacco, and unmarked valuables, 
especially silver and gold, proved highly sought after commodities throughout the Court of 
Cassation cases, usually seen in cases involving a smuggling operation.  Customs officials 
immediately confiscated merchandise without a certificate, automatically labeling the products as 
British, especially cottons and muslins.  The lower prices of British cotton spurred considerable 
illegal trafficking.  Officials seized prohibited cotton and muslins imported into the Netherlands 
in an 1808 discussion.  The smuggling took place on the borders of the interior.  The 
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government established multiple brigades in the interior and the side of the range of customs to 
stop and seize prohibited items.  Later in the year, customs seized multiple pieces of muslins 
and percales from the entrance of the village Gand.55  In Gênes, Italy, shop owners Sieurs 
Chiralde and Rapallo, owned British goods, coffee, cotton, and other colonial goods, without a 
certificate in 1807.  Bought earlier, Chiralde and Rapallo never completed the proper paperwork 
and customs officials seized the goods.56  The Italian case displayed another trend seen 
throughout the cases.  Many attempted to justify the merchandise by claiming the goods fell 
under grandfather laws.  If bought before a certain time, laws grandfathered the products as 
legal.  The Court of Cassation normally held the unmarked goods as British and therefore 
subject to seizure. 
Although France expanded the textile industry in the empire, cheaper British raw materials 
swayed the local communities, increasing the amount of contraband.  Several of the offenders 
smuggling chiffons, cottons, and muslins originated from other countries.  High prices on 
French goods made even French communities and individuals unwilling to pay.  The Court 
discussed a case in 1807 of customs officials seizing a horse and cart carrying English 
merchandise in France.  The court questioned and held if transporting prohibited goods, the 
officials’ seizures of the mode of transportation remained legal.57   
While cotton remained a hot commodity for illegal traffickers, foodstuff appeared often in 
the cases due to the high taxes and inflated prices.  The Napoleonic years led to the inflated 
prices.  In Italy, armed individuals employed by veteran smugglers, fraudulently transported 
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coffee and sugar to the beach of Invrea, just beyond the port in 1806.  The smugglers avoided 
customs officials due to the help from the employer’s intelligence, transporting goods to an inn.  
The movements of the mules and the bundles brought some attention of the crime to the 
neighbors.  Officials seized the goods, declaring them as English colonial goods transported 
without a certificate.58  Shortages of food after 1810 led to tidy profits for transporting items 
like sugar and coffee.59    
During the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, other products developed into popular 
commodities.  British smugglers trafficked French soldiers and officers across the British 
Channel back to France.  Countries kept prisoners of war.  The extensive nature of the empire 
made policing almost impossible.60  In Britain enforcement along the Channel provided a 
challenge.  Policing the borders deemed a greater challenge for the French empire due to the 
multiple port cities and expansive coasts.  The situation grew more complex with the extensive 
nature of smuggling along the borders of the communes.  The size of the French empire made 
policing forces unable to fully cope with securing the blockade.  The gendarmeries proved 
unsuccessful in combating the bootleg operations across the European territories and ports.61 
Similar to the conscription offenses, trafficking products connected closely to more violent 
crimes.  Smugglers transported goods in two ways, either by land or sea.  The appellate cases 
revealed a strong relationship between physical violence and smuggling, normally seen in 
seaborne trafficking.  Smuggling by land and by sea routes used different methods.  Land 
smuggling, when viewing the Court of Cassation cases, involved a few individuals, allowing for 
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ease of movement and some protection against customs officials, indicating smaller operations.  
In the disputes offenders crossing borders traveled lightly, normally with one or two bundles of 
goods.   
Many of the Court of Cassation decisions dealing with smuggling operations consisting of 
three or more people led to violence.  Shipping products garnered more notice, due to the size 
of the transportation.  Ships, in most cases, needed crews.  More goods and more people 
created an atmosphere for violence.  Lower scale operations incited violence but the seaborne 
smuggling cultivated a more explosive atmosphere.  The Court of Cassation discussed a case in 
1805 originating from a department in Belgium, where Pierre Vanhoidouck and Hubert 
Vanhoidouck smuggled and used brutality against a guard.  Pierre Vanhoidouck struck a guard 
twice on the head with a rod while transporting contraband close to the Batavian boundary.  
Vanhoidouck attacked two other guards helping their comrade.62  In the Netherlands French 
customs officials intercepted a group on a ship located at a Dutch bank in a 1806 decision.  The 
French customs officials assumed the group carried contraband with the intent to sell.  The 
agents seized the merchandise.  The group resisted the seizure with violence and weapons.63  
In a 1808 discussion, individuals in Belgium used violence while smuggling goods.  "Customs 
officials . . . arrested two individuals, party to an armed crowd."64  When the individuals 
attempted to leave the officials’ custody, an armed struggle broke out and Jean-Louis Hardy, a 
lieutenant, killed a perpetrator.65  The smugglers outnumbered the customs officials in the cases 
and the situations incited violent confrontations, although such cases appeared less often than 
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smaller operations in the Court of Cassation cases.   
The smuggling cases reveal trends not seen often in the conscription cases.  In the 
conscription cases the court routinely overturned the suits due to instances of incorrect procedure 
or false interpretation of the law.  In several smuggling cases the court overturned the decisions 
of the departmental courts.  The offenders acquired charges by the initial court, but the 
departments voided the ruling.  The department found in favor of the defendants, ignoring 
French laws and the Blockade.  The Court of Cassation concluded, during a review of the cases, 
the departments failed to follow the law, reinforcing the original decisions of the lower courts 
stating the defendants broke the law.  The Court of Cassation repeatedly reinforced the 
Continental Blockade and the certificate system as viable laws through the departments.  Not 
limited strictly to foreign departments, French departmental courts negotiated loopholes around 
the central government’s authority.  Customs officials seized a shipment of salt exceeding the 
weight of 17,500 kilograms noted on the official paperwork brought into the Lois harbor of 
Saint-Marian by Captain Rick in 1807.  The court tossed the suit out for a questionable seal.  
The Court of Cassation overturned the decision, stating incorrect seals resulted in valid 
seizures.66  Compared to the conscription cases, the smuggling cases suggested no one approved 
of the economic policies.  Few conscription suits clearly indicated instances of departmental 
defiance of the laws but commonly appeared in the smuggling suits. 
The economic system rewarded France, leading to the difficulties seen in the Court of 
Cassation cases revolving around the departments’s opposition to the program, unlike other 
exploitive policies.  The advantage favored Napoleon's interest, the army, and expansion.  In a 
case brought before the Court of Cassation in1806, customs seized outlawed goods from Benner 
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Wolff's possession.  Wolff, a resident in Mulhausen, claimed his location on the border of the 
Rhine placed him outside of the boundaries of the custom officials.67  The Court of Cassation 
disagreed with the conclusion, stating the blockade expanded to even the most extreme borders.  
Joseph Vermylen, Jean Willems, and Jean Hofmans, processed grain prices by the use of the old 
scales in Amsterdam rather than the new system in a 1818 suit before the Court.  When a ship 
arrived in Amsterdam carrying oats to Joseph Vermylen, a grain merchant in Mailines, weighed 
the grains according to the older measurements.  The defendants proclaimed the law in 
Amsterdam validated the weights.68  The case of Vemylen, Willems, and Hofmans attested to 
the local attempt to maintain traditions of their communities and states.  The departments began 
to reflect the local population’s opposition to French authority.  
The cases exhibited questions of territory, as well as attempts to retain both departmental and 
local autonomy.  Communities saw the Continental Blockade and French regulation as another 
form of French intrusion.  Similar to conscription laws in outcome, the economic ordnances 
placed the largest burden on the lower classes.  The laws, unemployment, and high taxes 
benefited few places in the empire.   Many of the cases brought to the Court of Cassation 
questioned territorial authority.  The departmental opposition to French authority correlates well 
with the local resistance seen throughout the cases.  Individuals committed the offenses, but the 
decisions of the departmental courts veer away from the French laws.  The organic grassroots 
nature of the crime resisted authority, but the department reinforced the notion of the offenses not 
being criminal.  The department’s acceptance of the individual’s actions to avoid following 
French edicts expands the realm of the commonality of the economic offenses and the acceptance 
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of the deeds..  In Belgium customs agents confiscated salt and a ship in a 1807 decision.  The 
court of the department of Deux-Nèthes refused to condone the seizure of the ship used in the 
offense.69  In Belgium Captain James Underdouwn of the ship The Crocodile limped into a port 
in Nieuport.  As a smuggler, the captain was carrying prohibited goods.  Customs officials 
seized brandy and tobacco in addition to the ship and the captain.  The original decision voided 
the seizures.  The Court of Cassation contested the decision, stating Captain Underdouwn 
smuggled the goods into French ports, and therefore was subjected to French laws, even if his 
ship received damage.70 
The Court of Cassation overturned cases of departmental opposition in smuggling extended 
beyond the sea routes to land routes.  Land trafficking and home seizures produced several 
examples for similar decisions.  Many justified the actions by alleging territorial issues 
regulated the laws.  In a 1808 decision customs seized prohibited cloth being transported at 
night in the German village of Cologne.  The confiscation took place at the border of the 
territory.  The offenders fled at the sight of the customs officials.  The departmental court 
voided the original decision and ordered restitution to the offenders.  The Court of Cassation 
stated the actions of the departmental court formally violated the law, even if the transportation 
took place on the extreme border.71  In Germany the border police "seized sugar from the home 
of Jean Stéphani in the commune of Carden" in a 1810 decision.72  Stéphani claimed he was not 
obligated to follow the laws of the blockade.  The Court of Cassation asserted the economic 
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policy applied to Stéphani.73  Customs officials seized muslin bags from Guillaume and Collin 
in 1811.  The foreign materials came into the French interior from foreign lands.  The 
department maintained the seizure took place beyond the boundary of the blockade, but the Court 
of Cassation overturned the decision.74 
Departments ignoring the economic policies commonly relied on territory for justification, 
but the departments used other rationale.  In France the department of Haut-Rhin manipulated a 
loophole in the economic laws requiring documentation for goods.  In an 1811 decision, 
officials "confiscated twenty-two pieces of unmarked cotton from Sieur Litschy's home, 
manufactured in the bordering commune of Schweighauzen" located on the far eastern boundary 
of France.75  The department annulled the charges, stating no laws specified a date for when 
items needed to be marked to prevent confiscation.  The appellate court determined the 
unmarked items made the seizure legal according to the definition of the law.76  In Belgium 
officials seized colonial foods in 1810.  The department declared the seizure null.  When 
brought under the Napoleonic umbrella, the Dutch and government agreed all British goods 
previously bought to be grandfathered into the economic policy and not subject to confiscation.  
The Court of Cassation overturned the departmental court's ruling.77  Highly involved in 
smuggling, the Dutch countries repeatedly surfaced throughout the cases.78  
The decisions by the departmental courts reinforced several notions seen throughout the 
local response to the French economic policies.  Locals saw the importation of goods as legal 
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despite the Continental Blockade.  Also, the departments attempted to establish autonomy from 
French rule.  A major argument for local resistance against government authority was to retain 
local autonomy and traditions.  Several of the countries and cities incorporated into France, like 
Hamburg and Holland, lost preexisting economic systems.  The departments' efforts to inhibit 
the blockade were not attempts to establish nationalism but portray the anti-French sentiment 
from the crippling policies.  The resentment included the entire empire beginning from the local 
population and extending to the departments.   
Napoleon's transformation of the economic system contributed to his administrative 
capabilities and the establishment of centralized government.  The Revolutionary government 
made changes in the economic system of France, establishing institutions.  The reforms created 
during the Revolution founded Napoleon's economic system, allowing for new management.  
Napoleon made the system work by "[creating a] much stronger links between the central 
government and the provinces".79  The community and departments saw the French empire's 
economic policies as detrimental to their perspective governments.  The lenient treatment of 
smuggling in the local courts and departments reaffirmed the communal viewpoint of the offense.  
Napoleon's policies crippled a large portion of Europe's economy.  Destroyed ports, transformed 
economic systems, and high inflation led to the regional population carrying the heaviest 
burden.80  All social classes participated in illegal importing of merchandise into the empire, 
while the department and communes reinforced the opposition. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESISTANCE TO PUPLIC AUTHORITY 
Historians credit Napoleon's economic and military programs with installing the 
bureaucratic machinery of centralized administration in Europe.  The larger state government 
extended to the communities.  Historians such as Alexander Grab claim the process of 
modernity in Europe began with Napoleon's policies.1  The rural localities reacted forcefully 
against the execution of the legislation after implementation.  The provincial population's role 
avoiding conscription and trafficking goods into the empire exemplified the discontent at the 
grassroots level of administration.  The Court of Cassation cases demonstrate another facet of 
the resistance efforts.  The appellate court cases from 1804-1820 include all the departments 
under the Napoleonic umbrella, fewer cases in contrast to the massive collections of the various 
countries archives.  Similar to smuggling and conscription offense, the same crimes 
counteracting the authority of the government appeared throughout the departments.  The suits 
display the amount of crime against representations of French authority.  As noted earlier, the 
institutions of administration served the will of the government, not of the masses.  The 
aggression and obstruction against government agents generated from economic and military 
concerns. 
Intrusions against private property and personal prerogative fostered animosity in the rural 
populations against the administration.  The quantity of resistance to government authority 
during French occupation seen in the Court of Cassation cases from 1804-1820 suggests a large 
amount of local opposition to representation of government authority.  Hostility against public 
officials frequently appeared on the appellate court roster.  While conscription evasion and 
smuggling defied French laws, the violations against official administering authority in the 
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community directly attacked Napoleonic policy.  Attempted murder turned into an extreme 
form of avoidance.  The transgressions expressed the locals distaste for French control.  The 
community saw the laws as intrusive, willing to resort to violence to renounce the laws.  The 
crimes indicate the extent of the central administrations encroachment into the rural communities 
in terms of the economic and military policies.  The general public disapproved of the 
gendarmerie searching their homes for deserters or the droit réunis checking the stores of wine 
to determine the correct levels.  Individual efforts against regulation resulted in the majority of 
the resistance in the Court of Cassation cases from 1804-1820. 
Disputes routinely stimulate hostility to physical violence.  Large scale movements 
appeared less often than individual abuses against the officials.  Jean Verseil rebelled, beat, and 
injured a person while in the army in southern France.2  In an 1812 judgment, "Philippe 
Vigneron, Antoine Sterne, and Achille Volet, officers of health, of the military hospital of 
Munster, caused armed rebellion in the military."3  The victim determined the difference in the 
suits of disruption and resistance.  The majority of the crimes fell within the realm of 
opportunity rather than premeditation.  Aggressors assailed officials implementing some aspect 
of Napoleonic law, not random people.  Several cases of general rebellion fail to specify the 
victim, but many instances of violence against named government officials existed throughout 
the departments.   
The historiography pays little attention to the confrontations between the agents and the 
local population during the Napoleonic years.  Prominent historians on French rule throughout 
the Napoleonic Empire, such as Michael Rowe and Alan Forrest, discuss the local response 
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against the men implementing the French program, but as a rational extension of the crime.4  
The offenses committed in local communities throughout out the departments detail the 
challenges posed by rural populations.  Similar to illegal trafficking of goods and conscription 
avoidance, the community actively participated in rebellion and accepted the individuals 
committing the offenses.  The appellate cases show the local populations readiness to resort to 
violence against officials, even if the crime indirectly affected the agent.5 
Generally, academics concentrate on either one motive for justification for the offenses 
against French law, neglecting the fact that both crimes provoked anger and hostility.  
Historians focus on either military or economic incentives for the offense.  The Court of 
Cassation cases, in particular those concerning the hostility to the government agents, indicate 
both programs caused local communities to obstruct authority.  The policies of conscription 
laws, taxes, and Blockade intertwined, while the rural populations expressed resentment for all of 
the exploitive edicts.  Many of the cases demonstrate a specific policy motivated the crime, but 
both explanations concerned the inhabitants.  In the Napoleonic foreign departmental history 
research on conscription procedure and the modes of evasion grow progressively.  Few recent 
historians, such as Katherine Aasltead, discuss the economic motive as the main source of local 
opposition.6  Historians fail to separate the crimes from the policy to determine the extensive 
nature of the crimes.  The animosity towards government policies from the regional 
communities shows the local's attitude toward government.  During the Napoleonic period, 
regionalism remained prominent, and individuals took extreme measures, such as violence and 
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fraud, to avoid following the laws. 
In the foreign departments economic pressures and military involvement fostered opposition 
by exploiting the rural populations of the departments.7  Political incentive scarcely played into 
the cases of noncompliance.  A "Police Director [named] d’Aubignosc in Hamburg reported to 
his superiors in Paris that public dissatisfaction concentrated on concrete economic grievances, 
rather than political conspiracy.”8  The Court of Cassation roster considered politically and 
nationally stimulated cases after 1815.  In Spain, where historians mark nationalism as the root 
of resistance to Napoleonic authority, the opposition remained local in nature.  Primarily, 
regional communities targeted the elites and authoritative figures.  The locals threatened and 
killed government officials, well-respected community leaders, and land owners.9  The Court of 
Cassation cases reveal seditious speeches against the King and his family in favor of the usurper 
or to provoke civil war after 1815.10  The few cases of seditious speech before 1815 neglected 
to state in specific language if the libel was against the government and its officials.  In southern 
France Marie Filis, wife Alivons, and Anne Nicolas, widow Trom, created public disorder 
through seditious speech in 1803.11  
The tensions generated from the French policies combined encouraged opposition to the 
government authority.  Not always clear, the cases revealed examples of economic and military 
tensions working in tandem.  Both policies impacted the empire.  Economic and military 
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abuses led to an Italian uprising spanning "over two-thirds of the kingdom's departments."  The 
implementation of an excise tax sparked a large uprising, hoping to take advantage of the limited 
military occupation.  Individuals destroyed government property and documentation including 
papers on conscription.  "Troops and gendarmerie" eventually stopped the uprising when the 
protesters started after bigger prizes.  Approximately "150 insurgents [were sentenced] to death 
and 125 [others received] hard labor."12  Conscription dissension in Italy normally resulted in 
less aggressive forms of resistance.13  Indirect measures hampering the laws occur often 
compared to the rarely seen large uprisings.  Individuals being caught with illegal goods in 
either their home or business appeared more frequently than people murdering officials.  
Violence in such cases occurred but on a lesser scale compared to the violence seen in 
conscription cases.  Individuals committed isolated offenses.  The larger protests were more of 
an exception to the rule rather than the norm.  An appellate case from a department in the 
Netherlands from 1806 exhibited the relationship between the economic and military concerns.  
Mathieu Emonts and multiple others violently attacked an armed transportation.  The group 
stole 44,390 francs from the transportation.14 
Isolated verbal or physical assaults committed by individuals caused hostility, while the 
violence in a few cases accelerated to death.  Rangers, the gendarmerie, the droit rénuis, and 
the custom officials received the bulk of the abuse.  The injuries unfolded throughout the 
empire.  The sheer amount of the resistance widens the depth of knowledge of local resistance 
to centralized government interference.  Conscription and contraband suits of violence 
demonstrate a rebellion against agents embodying French laws.  The officials represented 
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Napoleon's abusive policies.   
Men and women diligently engaged in spurning French authority.  In several of the cases 
women tirelessly objected the government exploitation with conscription and economic laws.  
Barbe, Anne, and Claire de Voghèse, in the Belgium commune of Guilleghem, rebelled against 
two gardes champêtres with armed force to allow Heukiste, a deserter, to escape in 1806.  The 
gardes champêtres found Heukiste in another home in Guilleghem and seized the deserter, 
causing the women to injury the officials.15  The violence in several cases, especially the ones 
involving conscription fraud, turned into family affairs.  In the department of the Nord, Alexis 
Louvion and daughters, Isabelle and Marie-Anne, used violence against the gendarmes searching 
for the refractory conscript, Charles Louvion, in an 1806 conclusion.  Charles Louvion pulled 
the family into the violence, who started the rebellion against the gendarmes.16  The Court 
heard a case in 1806 of the French refractory conscript, Nogaro, who hid with his family and 
others while harvesting wheat in Turkey.  The gendarmerie found Nogaro but he escaped in 
when his family argued with the gendarmerie."17  In France several members of the Brisebourg 
family (Lion, Davoust, Boutaloux, Beaurg, Brelonniere, Coutelle, Louis, and Martin) and the 
Bouchot family (Louis and Gabriel) "entered the home of Bailli, the garde forestier in an 1806 
case.18  The men went into the home with the intention to kill Bailli with sticks for arresting a 
conscript deserter.19  The harshness of military life and the ever-growing constraints brought 
about by the conscription laws led to the rural opposition.  Parents begged their children to 
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desert, while brothers serving as conscripts in the military hoped younger siblings avoided the 
draft.20   
During the Napoleonic era, regional communities confronted government official for various 
reasons.  France wanted to assure that the satellite countries remained beneficial to French 
interest, establishing an exploitive protectionist policy throughout the empire.  Several countries 
originally welcomed Napoleonic rule.  Southern Germany and Italy accepted French rule at the 
first stages of occupation, but the feelings changed under the oppressive Napoleonic policies.   
Regions objected to high taxes and supporting French troops stationed in the annexed 
countries.21  The Continental Blockade limited job opportunities in various places under French 
rule.  Napoleon's central administration relied heavily on the empire for support.  The 
countries subsidized a growing debt caused by an almost constant state of warfare.  To offset 
the cost of quartering, cities in Germany paid close to half a million francs in taxes in 1807.22  
Troops quartered and housed in annexed states increased direct taxes, while high excise taxes 
placed on basic merchandise made the goods virtually impossible to buy within the empire.  
Conscription laws depleted populations of men who fought for outside interest in faraway 
lands.23 
In the Court of Cassation cases involving rangers, the local resistance proved to be 
destructive.24  The rangers and police received a great deal physical damage by the rural 
communities throughout the appellate suits.  Men who hunted in imperial woods or cut down 
unauthorized plots of forests life and trees received notice from the rangers in most of the cases.  
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Hunting licenses in France sold at "the low to mid-hundreds," establishing the crime of hunting 
without licenses as abundant and difficult to successfully apply.25  Men inclined to corruption 
collected incredibly low salaries.  Similar to conscription invasion crimes, the lower classes 
committed the frauds.26  The offenses involved individual people, and the atmosphere for an 
arrest sparked conflicts.  The transgressions entailed weapons, usually firearms or some sort of 
tools used as a weapon.  In an 1805 review, in the department of the Sarre gardes forestiers 
surprised Pierre Hector and Mathieu Strempler during a commission of a crime in the national 
forest.  When the two gardes forestiers attempted to arrest Hector and Strempler, the two 
resisted violently, assaulting the gardes forestiers.  The gardes forestiers subdued Strempler and 
Hector, seizing the horse, cart, and the wood the individuals cut.27   
Locals’ violence extended to any agent acting with administrative authority.  Men enforcing 
forestry laws received a great deal of backlash from the regional populations for administering 
hunting and gathering laws.  Transgressors used extreme violence in several of the cases.  In 
France, Jean-Claude Proset struck Pierre-Hubert Gros, a ranger, with a hook and without any 
provocation Gros attack took place during his surveillance duties.  The court asserted in 1806 
"Prost committed a cruel mistreatment of Gros with hatred and vengeance."28 
Officials received the abuses for executing the laws.  The violence went beyond the local 
rangers and gardes champêtres applying the rural laws, included the local policing agents.  In a 
1805 decision locals used violence, assaulting mounted police in southern France when assisting 
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a bailiff29  Another example showed Jean and Claude Jesencée, Laurent Vieva, and Benoît 
Ollivain violently abusing the gendarmes with "pitchforks and other farm instruments" in 1804, 
in France.30  In Belgium, 1803, Pierre Sjongers, Norbert Swoltz, and Caroline Pééters 
transported contraband and used arms against three gendarmes.31  Pierre Bordesoulle, in France 
in an 1810 ruling, assailed the gendarmes by throwing stones and injuring the officials.32 
As the gendarmerie functioned as Paris's policing agency, the violence from the local 
populations illustrated resentment with Napoleon's control.33  Individuals in an 1805 judgment 
assaulted a bailiff and two gendarmerie in France.  Although the offenders attacked the 
gendarmerie, the men looked and dressed like bourgeoisie.  The gendarmerie wore no 
identifying marks and failed to announce themselves as government officials.34  The Court 
discussed a case in 1804 in Belgium where Christophe Sponghers and his family violently 
assaulted the gendarmes.35  In the south of France individuals used armed resistance against 
gendarmes, injuring them in an 1806 finding.36  Local populations saw the recruitment officers 
and the gendarmerie as criminals for enforcing the laws implemented by the government.  The 
communities’ efforts to oppose changes from the centralized state in terms of conscription 
evasion depict another facet of the local's attempt to maintain a regional autonomy.37  
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The Court of Cassation cases revealed the military as an active tool against the rebelling 
locals.  Several of the suits displayed the military interference as an ineffective tool for 
deterrence.  The local populations continued to rebel and in several cases turned against any 
officials coming to aid others.  The Court discussed in 1805 a case that took place in France 
where gendarmes acting in the scope of their duties experienced hostility with menace for the 
military from an armed crowd, firing at the men.38  In another decision in 1807, a fight broke 
out during a public celebration attended by Jean-Georges Lod, Jean-Georges Jacquot, and others 
in France.  Someone called for the national guard of the commune of Chagey to restore order.  
The brawlers retaliated against the public authority figures.  Individuals beat, wounded, and 
disarmed the soldiers, in addition to shooting the mayor's assistant and threatening the mayor by 
firing at him.39  In France, three gardes champêtres arrested a conscript at the request of as 
assistant deputy.  The arrest enticed a crowd to form in the village and the locals assaulted the 
gardes champêtres.40   
Natives and conscripts concerned with the military program used excessive violence against 
government institutions, usually the gendarmerie.   Economic policies generated violence, but 
the conscription laws prompted variations in the methods of the offenders and the amount of 
people involved.  The offenses against officials revolving around the military program escalated 
in violence compared to economic motivations.  The Court of Cassation cases show fewer cases 
concentrating on conscription motivations compared to crimes stimulated by economics.  The 
violence in the conscription cases prompted more people to violence.  Very few economic cases 
                                                                                                                                                             
University Press, 1989), 232-33. 
38 France, Court of Cassation, "Case 169," Bulletin des arrêts de la Cour de cassation rendus en matière criminelle T10, no. 7 
(March 1806) http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k5850100n.image (Accessed July 3, 2012): 303-304. 
39 France, Court of Cassation, "Case 9," Bulletin des arrêts de la Cour de cassation rendus en matière criminelle, no. 1 
(November 1808) http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k6158962h.image# (Accessed July 20, 2012): 20-22. 
40 France, Court of Cassation, "Case 215," Bulletin des arrêts de la Cour de cassation rendus en matière criminelle T12, no. 9 
(September 1808) http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k5855195p.image (Accessed July 15, 2012): 406-408. 
66 
 
dealt with more than a few individuals.  The military cases provoked villages to express anger 
and brutality against officials.  Alan Forrest states conscription laws sparked the most conflict 
between the community and officials.41  In Germany local populations rioted, outraged by 
conscription laws.  In Hüfingen and Mergentheim peasants armed themselves with farming 
tools and went to the local authorities in violent protest.42  While the Court of Cassation cases 
reveal that most offenses were individual, conscription policies aroused a few large scale protests.  
The cases demonstrate several examples of the rural population joining together to aid in a 
deserters escape.  In an 1808 decision the gendarmerie pursued a deserter, Franҫois Carnuve, 
who committed a theft by breaking and entering a property in France.  Carnuve escaped from 
the prison detaining him for desertion.  The gendarmerie recruited citizens to help find the 
deserter.  Two citizens acting as police apprehended Carnuve.  The citizens held Carnuve in 
the house of another villager while waiting for the gendarmerie to take custody.  A mob formed, 
demanding Carnuve's release, and used violence to help Carnuve escape.43  Several examples of 
the violence against the gendarmerie took place in France.  In France a crowd assaulted the 
gendarmerie in an 1806 judgment.44  In France, gendarmerie arrested Jean-Étienne Tassy, "a 
sailor accused of desertion" in an 1806 decision.45  The local community assaulted the 
gendarmerie, allowing Tassy to escape custody.46  The disputes not only prove the hatred for 
the laws by most of the populations but reaffirm the locals understanding of conscription 
avoidance as not a crime. 
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The bulk of conscription resistance, including the efforts against authority figures, consisted 
of isolated efforts of opposition.  "In 1806, Jean Gallon, Julien Albert, and other refractory 
conscripts attacked the gendarmerie pursuing them."47  Officials arrested Gallon and Albert.  
The prefect of Nantes issued the two with maps and orders to join their corps.  The son deserted 
again and officials arrested him again in 1808.48  The Court of Cassation discussed in 1805 a 
case from the department of the Nord, where Nicolas, Antoine, Louis Lemaire, and Manie Vilain, 
widow Lemaire, used violence against the gendarmerie while harboring a deserter.49 
Aware of the resistance associated with conscription, at least one satellite state attempted to 
avoid implementing the policies..  King Louis of Holland, a brother of Napoleon, attempted to 
avoid the resistance of conscription by creating a new measure to gain manpower, the 
employment of young poor boys and orphans.  The plan served two purposes.  The program 
avoided implementing conscription laws, and created less stress on charities.  The scheme 
backfired spectacularly and triggered public outraged.  Conscription came to Holland after 
Louis was forced to flee for not following Napoleon’s dictates.50  Johan Joor asserts the 
conscription legislations in Holland resulted in civil unrest and resistance.51  Joor's study 
asserted opposition in Holland rarely culminated in violence.  The Court of Cassation suits 
indicate the violence remained prevalent in the government authority cases.  The laws and 
government intrusions enticed violence.   
When conscription requirements fell short, the government turned to the army.  Napoleon 
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inherited the practice from the Revolutionary government.  When local populations rose in 
rebellion, similar to Italy, the military quelled the rebellion.  As a policing agent for the central 
administration,the military's role expanded past a tool for imperialism.  The use of the military 
increased throughout most of the departments.52  Mainly, the gendarmerie imposed conscription 
and detected deserters, demonstrating an intrusive relationship with the rural populations.  As 
Paris controlled police force, local resistance to the conscription laws naturally led to hostility 
against the gendarmerie.  Offenders stoned, assaulted, and attacked the men when collecting 
deserters and conscripts.  The communities refused to defend the gendarmerie when preforming 
their duty.  In an 1811 Court of Cassation discussion, individuals with firearms attacked a group 
of gendarmerie searching for a deserter in France.  The offenders killed a member of the 
gendarmerie.53  In Loubens deserters assaulted officials in a bar.  When a deserter physically 
struck an official with "a bottle full of wine," the locals said nothing.54  Even when most of the 
village saw violence committed against government officials, eyewitnesses remained scarce.55   
In a village in France community members verbally injured the gendarmerie after finding the 
offenders visiting a cabaret during their patrol in 1803.56  
While individuals tended to commit conscription crimes, the Court of Cassation cases 
demonstrate examples of communal efforts against authority figures.  Rather than displaying 
departmental wide attacks representing nationalism, the trial records reveal an almost universal 
dislike for the policies.  Recent studies such as Ute Planert in “Conscription, Economic 
Exploitation, and Religion in Napoleonic Germany” state conscription fostered the most hostility 
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from rural populations.57  The "departments of Musone, Metauro, and Tronto," made a call for 
over a thousand men, sparking aggression and draft dodging.  The government postponed the 
order while prosecuting the offenders harshly.58 
Much of the historiography suggests conscription caused the most outrage among local 
populations.  The Court of Cassation cases support the notion of a strong hatred on the local 
level for conscription, but the agents applying the economic policies received similar abuses.  
Violations against administrative agents in economic offenses varied from aggressive smugglers 
to infuriated property owners.  Economic concerns usually comprised of small operations or 
individual committing the offenses.  The crimes in trafficking goods and against the droit réunis 
follow similar patterns.  The abuse against the custom officials and droit réunis were 
individualized attacks on agents representing French authority.   
The violence against officials associated with economic crimes differed in some cases from 
other forms of antagonism.  Unlike conscription offenses, either verbal or physical abuses 
portrayed the fiscal bitterness against officials.  Attacks against the droit réunis emerged as the 
most persistent crime against economic officials.  People turned increasingly violent when the 
droit réunis attempted to enter private property.  The cases of regional villages committing 
violence against officials associated with the economic policies appeared more frequently 
compared to conscription cases.  Violence against officials implementing conscription laws took 
various forms.  The economic offenses vary little in the type of crime being committed.  Many 
of the facts presented in the Court of Cassation trials on economic crimes show incredibly similar 
trends.  The offenders committed the same offenses and normally for the same reason.  A large 
portion of the violence against the officials dealt with individuals taking offense against agents 
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intruding on their private property.  The cases repeatedly prompted the court to provide more 
detailed and longer explanations concerning the decisions.  Few details changed from case to 
case.  The rulings concerning violence associated with illegal trafficking of prohibited 
merchandise followed similar trends in that the offenses linked together.  Much of the droit 
réunis work revolved around ensuring the legality of goods an individual possessed.  The droit 
réunis checked who was buying illegal and possibly smuggled goods.  In the conscription cases 
concealment, evasion, and fraud were more common compared to the brutality seen in the droit 
réunis cases.  While the economic crimes against officials appear with a great deal of frequency, 
the offenses fail to vary in motivation and circumstance.  The local population disliked both 
conscription and economic policies.  Although the economic policies tended to stimulate less 
aggressive reactions from the communities, the Court of Cassation displays more cases revolving 
around economic hostility. 
The economy affected most individuals due to the transformation caused by the 
modifications.  The situation in the Germanic city of Hamburg led to rebellion from 1811 to 
1813.  Officials exerted more control during this time and had really cracked down on 
smuggling.  In Hamburg the custom officials, agents of the droit réunis, and the douaniers 
received as much animosity as the gendarmerie in Hamburg.59  The officials working for the 
Napoleonic administration realized quickly the policy caused many of the economic straits 
resulting in the offenses.  Reports to Paris noted the violence against the officials symbolized an 
"anti-French sentiment in general."60 
Customs officials work fell along the same lines of the rangers, prone to violent outbreaks.  
The officials handled in smuggling offenses and checking certificates and markings.  The droit 
                                                 
59 Douaniers refers to toll officials 
60 Aaslestad, "War without Battles: Civilian Experiences of Economic Warfare during the Napoleonic Era in Hamburg," 129-30. 
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réunis searched through the personal property and stores of business owners to determine the 
amount of wares possessed.  The officials investigated whether individuals bought smuggled 
goods by checking marks as well as if the proprietor used the proper amount of goods since the 
last visit.  For instance, if an individual owned a bar and the amount of liquor in the stores did 
not change from the last visit from officials or if the proper marks were missing from the goods, 
the officials assumed the commodities were bought illegally from outside the blockade.  The 
more subtle crime of resistance of trafficking goods in economic matters appeared more often 
than the violent crimes.   
Both international and domestic resistance occurred from the French economic policies.  
Many rural populations actively and vigorously resisted the intrusion of the French officials.61  
Confiscating a person's property took government exploitation to a different level compared to 
conscription.  Sieur Vander-Veen, a boat-man and conductor of a small merchant boat of 
Rotterdam in the Netherlands, committed violence against customs officials in 1812.  "Six 
customs officials patrolled the canal of Zick in Ryswick, and noticed the arrival of the small boat 
[controlled by Sieur Vander-Veen], in the entrance of the village of the Hage."62  Sieur 
Vander-Veen refused the officials request to board the boat, which necessitated the requisition of 
armed force.  The officials uncovered several liters of wine.  Sieur Vander-Veen verbally 
insulted and threatened the officials after the seizure of the wine."63  
The international departments participated more diligently in the economic decisions.  The 
economic cases convey more individual defiance for French authority, but large scale violence 
took place in several instances.  In an 1807 decision in the district of Bonn, Franҫois-Michel 
                                                 
61 This fact is evident from my research but is also discussed in Aaslestad, “Revisiting the Continental System: Exploitation to 
Self-Destruction in the Napoleonic Empire,” 119. 
62 France, Court of Cassation, "Case 137," Bulletin des arrêts de la Cour de cassation rendus en matière criminelle T18, no. 11 
(July 1813) http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k5854870z.image (Accessed August 25, 2012): 339.  ". . .six employés des droits 
réunis, étant en surveillance sur le canal de Zick à Ryswick, ont vu arriver cette barque à l'entrée de la ville de la Haye. . ." 
63 Ibid, 339-344. 
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Probst and Balthazar Trantsvig transported contraband and started a riot on the nights of the 8 
and 9 of November.  The accused delivered several blows with sticks to the head of the custom 
lieutenant at his home.64  The Court discussed a cases from 1806 from a Geneva department, 
where Franҫois Mugnier, Marie Gallax (his wife), and Claude Mugnier (his son) transported 
prohibited tobacco.  When the lieutenant and several custom officials seized the tobacco, the 
family attacked the custom officials with a knife and stones.  The health officers reported the 
family seriously injured the custom officials.65  The tax collector, Habert, accused Gramidon of 
committing violence against him and his bureau in the French district of Langon in an 1806 
discussion.66 
Customs officials received the most violence from the district populations in concern with 
economic motivations, but the droits réunis proved to be the most intrusive officials 
administrating the Napoleonic program.  Throughout the Court of Cassation cases, agents 
confirmed the legality of the commodities.  Normally, the goods in question required the 
payment of high taxes.  Liquor and wine appeared as the most popular commodity to buy 
illegally throughout the decisions, seen approximately 273 times throughout the cases from 1804 
to 1820.  The majority of the individuals committing the crimes owned businesses.  
Government interference with revenue stimulated a situation teeming with conflict.  Joseph 
Pellegrini, a cabaretier, in a 1808 Court of Cassation discussion, resisted a visit by the droits 
réunis during a visit, not allowing the officials entrance into his cellar.  Pellegrini refused to 
withdrawal from the premise or follow the officials’ orders, proceeding to verbally abuse the 
                                                 
64 France, Court of Cassation, "Case 121," Bulletin des arrêts de la Cour de cassation rendus en matière criminelle, no. 6 (April 
1809) http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k6159007h.image (Accessed August 2, 2012), 264. 
65 France, Court of Cassation, "Case 9," Bulletin des arrêts de la Cour de cassation rendus en matière criminelle T12, no. 1 
(August 1807) http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k5854859x.image (Accessed June 29, 2012): 17-19. 
66 France, Court of Cassation, "Case 32," Bulletin des arrêts de la Cour de cassation rendus en matière criminelle T12, no. 2 
(April, 1808) http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k5855161w.image# (Accessed June 28, 2012), 61-62. 
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officials.67  In an 1809 ruling Corneil Kerckhove, a cabaretier owner in Furnes in Belgium, 
refused to open cabinets for inspection.  Kerckhove claimed he did not have the key to open the 
cabinets, and the inspectors took the actions as refusal.68  Marie Vadel, widow Manens, was 
accused of wine fraud in a case brought before the Court in 1808.  In France the cabaretière 
owner's wine flow remained the same from the last inspection.  A visitor, Léonard Simon, 
verbally assaulted and threatened the droit réunis officials inspecting Vadel's property.69  Joseph 
Pelazo, in Italy, refused to open his cellar for inspection and insulted the droit réunis officials in 
an 1809 discussion.70  In 1806, the Court examined the case from the French commune of 
Issoudun, where individuals rebelled against the droit réunis.  Ragon and Gordat in a crowd 
expressed threats of violence against the droits reunis.71  In Belgium the droit réunis seized two 
metric tons of beer from the the cellar of the cabaretier Zachée de Pauw in an 1806 ruling.  He 
violently forced the agents out of the building, where the droit réunis returned to the office.72   
The suits of abuses against the droit réunis show the resentment the regional communities 
felt from the exploitive and intrusive French economic policies.  Checking personal property, 
especially when the majority of the population took part in illegal activities, formed a situation 
that breeds opposition and violence.  Studies on the economic motives of resistance overlook 
the purpose of the droit réunis.  In the Court of Cassation cases the insults and abuses against 
the droit réunis feature a large portion of the crimes of opposition to authoritarian figures.  The 
                                                 
67 France, Court of Cassation, "Case 132," Bulletin des arrêts de la Cour de cassation rendus en matière criminelle, no. 7 (April 
1809) http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k6159009b.image (Accessed August 2, 2012): 290-292. 
68 France, Court of Cassation, "Case 46," Bulletin des arrêts de la Cour de cassation rendus en matière criminelle T15, no. 2 
(October 1810) http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k5850036x.image (Accessed August 15, 2012): 84-85. 
69 France, Court of Cassation, "Case 83," Bulletin des arrêts de la Cour de cassation rendus en matière criminelle T5, no. 4 
(November 1810) http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k58500417.image (Accessed August 15, 2012): 164-167. 
70 France, Court of Cassation, "Case 86," Bulletin des arrêts de la Cour de cassation rendus en matière criminelle T5, no. 4 
(November 1810) http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k58500417.image (Accessed August 15, 2012): 173-176. 
71 France, Court of Cassation, "Case 105," Bulletin des arrêts de la Cour de cassation rendus en matière criminelle T12, no. 5 
(June 1808) http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k5855172p.image (Accessed June 29, 2012): 199-200. 
72 France, Court of Cassation, "Case 47," Bulletin des arrêts de la Cour de cassation rendus en matière criminelle T12, no. 2 
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Continental System completely intertwined with Napoleon's economic program.  One of 
Napoleon's main objectives was to create an economic system in Europe to favor France.  The 
economic policy expressed the favorable French policies, making the job impossible.   
Opposition against French authority figures is the logical conclusion to discussions on the 
general feelings of discontent among the rural populations throughout the Napoleonic Empire.   
The rural communities lack of support for the French authority clearly indicated the frequency in 
which the cases occurred throughout the Court of Cassation cases from 1804-1820.  The 
offenses stretched beyond the local's beliefs that conscription evasion and the community saw the 
actions as legal.  Locals targeted representations of French authority.  Authority figures 
implementing French law, for either economic of military motivations, emerged more frequently 
than crimes against the policies themselves.   
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CONCLUSION 
The Napoleonic years transformed Europe.  The economic policies established new trade 
routes and military drafts changed.  Napoleon amassed a large empire, with well over one 
hundred departments.  Historians see modernity in Europe beginning with the laws and 
organization of Napoleon's empire.  The programs initiated by Napoleon in the early nineteenth 
century garnered animosity from the local communities throughout the Continental System.  
The lower classes endured the brunt of the burden from the laws.  Conscription policies coerced 
young men from across the Continental System to fight, while the combination of high taxes and 
the Continental Blockade crippled most trade industries.  Local populations resisted the policies, 
evading conscription laws, avoiding the taxes and Blockade while countering government 
authority.   
Although the crimes against government authority imply attempts of establishing 
nationalism in the regional communities, since individuals participated in the defiance 
throughout most of the departments, the crimes remained local and organic.  Few historians 
claim Napoleonic policy cultivated national sentiments rather than enforcing local autonomy.  
Frederick Schneid, in Soldiers of Napoleon's Kingdom of Italy: Army, State, and Society, 
1800-1815, asserts residual national feelings endured in Italy stemming from the military 
involvement.  Similar to other countries, Italy turned into a military state, since the last years of 
Napoleon's rule saw widespread desertion.  Schneid argues any feelings of loyalty toward 
France disappeared, fostering a new Italian nationalism.  The coercive nature of the law poses a 
challenge to Schneid's argument.  The government removed choice and people refused to serve.  
Schneid relies on the numbers of deserters as forging a nationalistic feeling but glosses over the 
military conditions as well as the local influences on the role of desertion.  Never fully 
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developing the ideas of the nationalism forming in Italy, Schneid states a brood feeling of 
nationalism formed during the period.1  Modern interpretations resist the idea of nationalism 
forming in Italy during the Napoleonic Era.  
While not nationally motivated, the resistance from the communities formed organically by 
local individuals.  The Napoleonic model relied on the local governments executing the 
legislation enacted by the central administration.  The administration delegated the laws to the 
rural authorities.  When the provincial governments refused to properly administer the laws, the 
prefects turned to military force, the main recourse for noncompliance.  Cooperation by local 
communities determined the success of the policies.  Blatant resistance originated from the 
communes.2  The exploitive policies garnered animosity and fostered evident opposition.  In 
the substantial empire Napoleon accumulated, conscription, the Continental Blockade, and 
offenses against authority illustrated the major challenges faced in successful executing the laws.   
Most departments, whether French or foreign, experienced resistance at the grass-roots level 
of administration.  Alan Forrest leads the discussion on Revolutionary and Napoleonic 
conscription in France.  In several of his books, Forrest claims the patriotic sentiments invoked 
during the French Revolution disappeared quite rapidly.  Forrest reaffirms the local levels 
opposition to French authority during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic years dealt with policies 
directly affecting the village.3  Ute Planert, in "Conscription, Economic Exploitation and 
Religion in Napoleonic Germany," asserts resistance in Germany derived from economic and 
military reforms rather than nationalism.4  The nationalist interpretation holds little validity as 
                                                 
1 Frederick C. Schneid, Soldiers of Napoleon's Kingdom of Italy: Army, State, and Society, 1800-1815 (Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1995), 31 
2 Katherine Aaslestad and Karen Hagemann, "1806 and Its Aftermath: Revisiting the Period of the Napoleonic Wars in German 
Central European Historiography," Central European History 39, no. 4 (December 2006): 574. (JSTOR) 
3 Forrest, The French Revolution and the Poor (New York: St. Martian’s 1981), 138-140.  
4 Ute Planert, “Conscription, Economic Exploitation and Religion in Napoleonic Germany,” in Napoleon and His Empire: 
Europe, 1804-1814, eds. Philip G. Dwyer and Alan Forrest (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007),133-34. 
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the different regions in Germany experienced various forms of rule.  Outside forces occupied 
Southern Germany before, unlike Prussia.5  Michael Rowe, author of "Napoleon and the 
'Modernization' of Germany," maintains "Napoleonic conscription did little to foster the national 
idea."6  The process of conscription promoted several distinctions.  Bitterness arose between 
those forced to serve compared to men not drafted.  A rift grew between the upper and lower 
classes.  Conscription legislation affected the rural poor more than the upper classes.7  
Katherine Aaslestad contends after Hamburg gained autonomy in 1813, local concerns remained 
prevalent in the city in "Remembering and Forgetting: The Local and the Nation in Hamburg's 
Commemorations of the Wars of Liberation".8   
The interpretations of the motives of resistance lean toward either military or economic 
strains.  Stuart Woolf, author of Napoleon's Integration of Europe, supports individuals mainly 
opposed Napoleonic policy for economic matters.  In his section entitled "Resistance", Woolf 
establishes the hostility in comparison with "Collaborators".  The collaborators were individuals 
who followed Napoleonic policy.  While not fond of French rule, the collaborators found a 
pattern for peaceful coexistence.  In "Resistance" Woolf compares resisters and collaborators, 
restraining the discussion to armed struggles on a larger scale.  Woolf discounts the importance 
of rural defiance as not falling within the armed struggles, placing the offenses in the realm of 
general law breaking.9   
Military motivations dominate the current historiography but a few recent works indicate 
economic tensions promoted the opposition from the local communes and cities.  Katherine 
                                                 
5 Ibid, 135. 
6 Michael Rowe, “Napoleon and the ‘Modernization’ of Germany,” in Napoleon and His Empire: Europe, 1804-1814, eds. Philip 
G. Dwyer and Alan Forrest (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 216. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Aaslestad, "Remembering and Forgetting: The Local and the Nation in Hamburg's Commemorations of the Wars of 
Liberation," Central European History 38, no. 3 (2005): 387. (JSTOR) 
9 Stuart Woolf, Napoleon's Integration of Europe (London: Routledge, 1991), 187-196, 226-237. 
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Aaslestad in "War without Battles: Civilian Experiences of Economic Warfare during the 
Napoleonic Era in Hamburg" observes the economic consequences of the Continental Blockade 
in the Hanseatic city of Hamburg, as well as others.  The arguments point toward local 
resistance as originating from the economic straits, causing the destruction of established 
businesses, of the blockade and French protectionism.  Aaslestad makes an effective argument 
for the economic explanation of local resistance.  Contraband, smuggling, and hatred of the 
officials make for a convincing debate.  Aaslestad creates a connection between military 
involvements in civilian life in "War without Battles," but the military occupation provides the 
connection.  Aaslestad's argument discusses the opposition as a local issue based on local 
concerns.  The analysis, while not completely one-sided, relies heavily on the economic 
explanation.10 
Historians recently began to focus on the international elements of Napoleon's military 
policies in the Continental System.  The historiography concerning Napoleonic conscription 
exploded in the 1990s and continues to grow.  The bulk of the new works concerning the 
Napoleonic Wars deals with the issues revolving around conscription.  Alexander Grab argues 
in "Army, State, and Society: Conscription and Desertion in Napoleonic Italy (1802-1814)" 
conscription proved the most hated policy enacted and the primary target for opposition.  
Enforcement required much of the government’s energy.11  Alan Forrest explored the various 
effects of conscription on the local population and the means of resistance in several works.  
The many discussions range from all aspects of conscription in France from the Revolution to the 
Napoleonic years, including the frequency of desertion, the life of the offenders, and the extreme 
                                                 
10 Aaslestad, "War without Battles: Civilian Experiences of Economic Warfare during the Napoleonic Era in Hamburg," in 
Soldiers, Citizens, and Civilians: Experiences and Perceptions of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 1790-1820, eds. Alan 
Forrest, Karen Hagemann, and Jane Rendale (London: Palgrave, 2008), 118-132. 
11 Grab, "Army, State, and Society: Conscription and Desertion in Napoleonic Italy (1802-1814)," The Journal of Modern 
History 67, no. 1 (March 1995): 28. (JSTOR) 
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dislike of the local population to the military policy.  Forrest fails to promote the economic 
aspect as a prominent feature in the argument.12 
More recent studies of different annexed and satellite countries cooperation with Napoleon's 
conscription policies strengthen the level of rural disobedience in the central government’s 
ability to implement the laws.  Michael Rowe's "Between Empire and Home Town: Napoleonic 
Rule on the Rhine, 1799-1814" associates much of the administration’s problems with 
Napoleon's policies concerning conscription.  "Military conscription," according to Rowe, 
"severely tested the Napoleonic administration's ability to penetrate the everyday lives of 
ordinary people."13   Local elites demonstrated unwillingness to comply with the conscription 
laws, which turned into a major reason for the excessive nature of the difficulty in controlling the 
local administration.14  Michael Broers's "Cultural Imperialism in a European Context? Political 
Cultural Politics in Napoleonic Italy" approaches the discussion of the struggles in Italy caused 
by French occupation differently.  French arrogance, in the opinion of Broers, developed 
pressure and helped foster opposition in the Kingdoms of Italy and Naples.  French 
protectionism resulted from Napoleonic policies, translating to French arrogance in the foreign 
territories.  The French outlook was part of the broader scope of social disdain represented by 
the military and economic reforms.15 
The use of conscription to develop a large army forced Napoleonic laws and administration 
to expand throughout Europe.  The Continental Blockade and other economic policies protected 
French industry by removing the competition and creating crippling taxes.  The burdens created 
                                                 
12 Forrest, Conscripts and Deserters: The Army and French Society during the Revolution and Empire  
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1989): vii-viii. 
13 Rowe, "Between Europe and Home Town: Napoleonic Rule on the Rhine, 1799-1814," The Historical Journal 42, no. 3 
(September 1999): 664. (JSTOR) 
14 Ibid, 666 
15 Michael Broers, "Cultural Imperialism in a European Context? Political Culture and Cultural Politics in Napoleonic Italy," 
Past & Present, no. 170 (February 2001): 159, 178. (JSTOR) 
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by the military and economic policies worked in tandem.  Clear connections between the 
offenses working in cooperation persist throughout the Court of Cassation cases, such as 
deserters who turned to smuggling.  Even without a solid link, the local populations strongly 
resisted both programs.  Separating the economic and military resistance cases creates the 
fallacy of one policy encouraged the population to commit more crimes.  Viewing the Court of 
Cassation cases from France alone proves differently.  Communities strongly resisted both 
programs. 
Both the crimes of conscription fraud and smuggling functioned in similar ways.  Few 
cases involved developed into anything more than an isolated opposition to French authority.  
The prefect's lack of control of the government led to limited enforcement efforts.16  The 
institutions charged with the implementation proved ill-equipped and unable to achieve success.  
Although not entirely inept and appearing often throughout the cases, the officials of the 
gendarmerie were not highly successful either.  Enforcing the laws placed the local 
governments in difficult positions.  The central administration's role extended to the local level 
through the gendarmerie, asserting the state's interest before the local government.  Communes 
highly resisted the laws, leading to violence against administrators.   
The historiography views the motives for regional resistance with particular emphasis on 
either one policy or the other.  Historians chose either economic or military issue as justification 
for opposition, but the trend in the last twenty years favors conscription as the main cause of 
most hostility.  The Court of Cassation cases indicate through the frequency and similarities in 
the offenses a balance between the problems the local communities faced.  Both policies 
intruded and exploited the populations of the empire.   
                                                 
16 Gavin Daly, “’Little Emperors?’ Investigating Prefectural Rule in the Departments,” in Napoleon and His Empire: Europe, 
1804-1814, eds. Philip G. Dwyer and Alan Forrest (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 57. 
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Offenses throughout the departments at the grassroots level show individuals committing 
parallel crimes despite geographical differences.  Belgium, Italy, and Germany experienced the 
same fierce hostility as France.  Although Napoleon's policies followed a French protectionist 
program, French communities despised the policies.  The government created several special 
courts in the French departments due to the locals' reaction to Napoleonic policies.  The local 
populations in the French departments and the foreign departments acted in similar ways as 
shown by the facts of the Court of Cassation cases.   
The balance between the economic and military tensions began early in the rural local 
communities and continued to exist throughout the Napoleonic era.17  Conscription interfered 
with work and food supplies.  Coercive service took men away from the home.  The economic 
program brought about severe food shortages.  France needed the large army while stationing 
troops in foreign departments.   The tensions strained between the military force and locals as 
the community paid the costs for foreign occupation.  Napoleon's wars intertwined the 
economic and military policies.18     
                                                 
17 Alan Forrest, The Soldiers of the French Revolution, in Bicentennial Reflection on the French Revolution (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1990), 87-88. 
18 Ibid. 
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